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Nuclear Nonproliferation & Russian Nuclear Privatization

PREFACE
The atomic energy sector in Russia faces an uncertain future. Minatom is the
Ministry of Atomic Energy in Russia. It controls all of the nuclear activities both defense
and non-defense. Because of this it is the focal point of the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation
initiatives in Russia. Minatom is proposing to separate its defense and non-defense lines
and privatize the non-defense activities in hopes of making them a commercial success.
The energy sector in Russia has been racked by institutional failure and scandal. As a
consequence the country lacks dependable supplies of power, which seriously threatens
economic growth. Minatom claims that its restructuring and privatization initiatives will
help provide the energy the country needs for the future. However, serious problems
threaten the commercial success of Minatom’s ventures: Neither electricity sales nor nuclear power plant construction are profit-making enterprises currently. Moreover, nuclear
fuel processing is not as lucrative as it once was due to sharp declines in the world price
of nuclear fuel.
The current wholesale price of electricity in Russia at best barely covers the operating cost of nuclear generators. For power sold to neighboring countries the wholesale
price is slightly above the operating cost of nuclear generators, but it is still far below the
capital cost of new capacity. Minatom cannot expand domestic nuclear generation unless
the wholesale price of electricity within Russia increases dramatically or unless it receives increased subsidies from some source.
Nuclear power is not a sure winner against conventional generation technologies.
Hence, even if electricity prices increase to competitive levels, competition itself may
significantly curtail the plans for expansion of generation capacity and output within Russia. Similarly, Minatom cannot make its foreign nuclear construction ventures a commercial success unless it raises the price of construction.
Minatom makes money from its fuel processing activities, especially the HEU
deal with the U.S. However, as the world price of nuclear fuel has declined, so too have
these revenues. Hopes of expanding the fuel processing activities require costly technical
development and are not likely to be fulfilled.
On top of this, the proposed privatization of the non-defense, nuclear enterprises
only increases the risk of nuclear proliferation through the threat of corruption, foreign
involvement in nuclear material control issues, and the increased likelihood of reckless
behavior in the face of financial distress.
If Minatom is not able to raise significant funds from private investors and if privatization has the all too common effect of diverting cash into private pockets, the money
from U.S. sources with its attendant oversight will become increasingly important in
achieving U.S. national security goals. This money helps directly to control nuclear proliferation, and it helps to stabilize the Russian economy through the nuclear sector, which
comprises a substantial portion of the energy resources of the country. Taken as a whole,
the picture is one in which the value of U.S. hard-cash infusion into Minatom will likely
have an important stabilizing effect on the operation of the atomic energy sector and produce spillover benefits throughout the Russian economy.
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Russia's atomic energy minister, Aleksandr Rumyantsev, said this evening
he had had a meeting with President Vladimir Putin earlier in the day to
inform him on plans to set up a separate power generating company in the
nuclear sector. The emergence of a generating company that would embrace the Russian nuclear power plants “could help consolidate positions
of the atomic energy sector in the market economic system,” Rumyantsev
said. [ITAR-TASS, 11 Nov 01]

Restructuring and reform in the Russian energy sector are changing
economic incentives and hence the behavior of key organizations and especially the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). These changes will have a
direct impact on the national security interests of the United States and in
particular U.S. nuclear nonproliferation initiatives.
Minatom’s aim is to unify its major non-defense activities–power
generation, nuclear power plant construction, and nuclear fuel processing–
into one profit center. The commercial success of this venture is the key to
Minatom’s future. If Minatom founders on the rocks of market competition
in its nuclear enterprises, it will be much more sensitive to U.S. programs
that channel hard cash to its departments and divisions. On the other hand, if
the nuclear power enterprises prosper, Minatom will be less dependent on
the revenues flowing from U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs. Understanding the underlying economics of restructuring and privatization at Minatom will help assess the cost effectiveness of the many nuclear nonproliferation initiatives.
Minatom is a large and powerful political and economic force in Russia. It controls all of the nuclear activities in Russia. These include nuclear
power generation and power plant construction, nuclear fuel reprocessing,
certain other nuclear technology initiatives, and maintenance and control of
nuclear weapons.
Minatom’s new chief, Atomic Energy Minister Alexander
Rumyantsev, seems prepared to follow the plan developed over the last several years to expand the role of nuclear energy in Russian. This means produce more electricity and sell it to the highest bidder, build more nuclear
power plants at home and abroad, and expand nuclear fuel initiatives. However, these goals depend on restructuring Minatom and privatizing elements
of the nuclear industry as well as on reform in the Russian energy sector.
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Minatom claims to be positioning itself for privatization efforts that
will include direct foreign investment in some of its business ventures because this is the only way that it can obtain the financial capital necessary to
undertake the investment projects that it has planned. Foreign investment in
the nuclear industry has the potential to revitalize the sector but it may also
weaken control over nuclear material and technologies.
The fortunes of Minatom are not certain. There is no guarantee of fiscal stability for this ministry in the face of reform and restructuring in the
electric and gas industries. There is a basic instability in the energy sector as
a result of competitive restructuring that can cause Minatom to either profit
wildly or to verge on financial catastrophe. Privatization of Minatom will
heighten this effect. In the event of financial distress, privatization will undoubtedly induce more reckless behavior both financially and in the control
of nuclear material.
Minatom is promoting nuclear power both within Russia and internationally. The plan is elaborate and extensive. However, there is a fundamental question of its viability. Is nuclear power economically efficient?
Will Russia be able to make a profit from building nuclear plants in other
countries? Are new technologies in nuclear power generation and fuel processing economically feasible? Could reform of the gas industry cause nuclear power to fail the market test in the face of cheaper natural-gas combined-cycle turbine power plants? How will reform in the electric industry
affect cash flows and investment in nuclear power?
Sector-wide reform is underway. The non-payment problem in the energy industry is being brought under control. Both the gas and electric companies (Gazprom and UES) are collecting most of their bills in cash and
have begun to settle accounts between each other. There is still an issue of
debts owed by UES to the nuclear generators (Rosenergoatom), but cash
payments from UES to Rosenergoatom likely will soon be 100 percent for
current invoices. The restructuring of the electric industry is on schedule.
The plan is to have a fully functioning wholesale market in place by 2004.
The overhaul of the electricity sector is crucial to the expansion and
growth of the economy. Energy is an essential input for commerce and industry. If there is not an abundant and reliable supply of electricity the potential growth of the Russian economy will be hampered. The restructuring
of the electricity sector is intended to create the climate and institutions that
will attract private investment and boost supply of electric generation. The
question for Minatom is whether the economics of nuclear energy will make
it attractive financially relative to other technologies.
Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs
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Corruption has been rampant in Russia highlighted by extensive asset
shifting throughout the energy sector. However, openness and transparency
seem to be the new mantra for joint-stock enterprises. President Putin replaced the head of Minatom in March and the head of Gazprom in May
2001. At Gazprom, he specifically installed his own man and explicitly
charged him to clean up Gazprom’s finances. If corruption can be brought
under control, it will do two things: first, it will make private foreign investment in Russia more attractive; and second, it will relieve some of the
concern about privatization of nuclear enterprises.
Even so, privatization and foreign investment in the Russian nuclear
sector fundamentally depends on the economics of the nuclear enterprises.
Minatom is wagering its future on three non-defense business ventures¾nuclear power production, nuclear power plant construction, and nuclear fuel initiatives. Each of these ventures is questionable in light of the
changing institutions in the Russian energy sector. The problems and possibilities can be outlined as follows.
Electric Power
Electric energy sales generate a large portion of Minatom’s
budget¾over one-third. Even so, nuclear generation is arguably a money
losing proposition. Estimates indicate that the operation, maintanence, and
fuel cost of a standard nuclear power plant in Russia is around 1¢/kWh, of
which fuel costs are about half. The recent wholesale electricity price has
been less than this. Nuclear power plants in Russia have not been and may
not currently be recovering the out-of-pocket cost of production.
Two questions are raised: How can the nuclear generators operate if
their revenues are less than operating cost? One answer is that much of the
costs of nuclear generation, such as fuel and engineering services, are debits
and credits within Minatom’s budget, so Minatom is simply writing off
some of the losses. Another, more disturbing possibility is that the nuclear
plants are not being adequately maintained. The second question is, How
long can a situation like this go on? If Minatom is internally subsidizing
nuclear generation, this can go on so long as the funds can be found
elsewhere in the budget. However, if there are deficiencies in maintenance,
the plants eventually must be brought up to standard or risk nuclear accident.
In either case, the implications are discouraging in terms of
Minatom’s economic vitality. Even though electricity sales make up a large
share of Minatom’s budget, electric generation is not a cash cow. Our
conclusion is that unless reform in the electricity market increases the
wholesale price, nuclear power sales are unlikely to provide enough money
Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs
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into the future to properly maintain the nuclear plants much less offer
support to Minatom’s other ventures.
One avenue for increasing revenues may be through international
sales. Minatom is actively pressing to sell more electricity outside of Russia.
It has been engaged in a long-running battle with UES, which controls the
grid and also owns most of the conventional generators in the country. UES
has been unwilling to allow Minatom to independently market power. The
reasons are simple. First, UES wants to have nuclear power capacity at its
disposal in satisfying domestic demand. This is valuable because UES does
not always pay 100 percent hard currency for the nuclear power that it takes.
Second, to the extent that excess capacity exists inside Russia, UES wants to
sell this power internationally and collect the revenues for itself.
By and large, the forces of reform and reorganization in the electric
industry are moving in Minatom’s favor. Recently, both the Ministry of
Monopoly and the Federal Energy Commission ruled against UES and in
favor of Minatom to allow it to sell electricity across the border.
However, this alone will not solve the problem of inadequate
wholesale tariffs. International sales of Russian electricity imply that there is
some excess capacity in the Russian system in some regions and at some
times during the electricity demand cycle. Even so, it is not possible
economically or politically and probably not feasible physically for the grid
operator to allow electricity to flow to foreign countries if there are domestic
power shortages that could be assuaged by this capacity. Ultimately, the only
solution is increased domestic prices. Possibly, but not certainly, the
evolving reform of the wholesale electric market will yield this result.
Nuclear Power Plant Construction⎯Domestic
Nuclear power currently provides about 15 percent of Russia’s power.
Minatom hopes to expand this to 20 percent over the next 7 years. To do so,
it anticipates building four more nuclear plants and refurbishing several of
the existing reactors. However, just like energy sales nuclear power plant
construction depends critically on increases in the wholesale electric price,
but even this may not be enough.
Nuclear power competes with natural gas and to a lesser extent with
coal and oil in Russia as a fuel source for heat and electricity. Russia has the
world’s largest natural gas reserves. Minatom has long argued that the most
profitable strategy is to export natural gas to western Europe and produce
electricity in Russia using nuclear fuel. However, whether nuclear power is
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more efficient than natural gas generation even in this scenario is
questionable.
Consider the problem from the point of view of an investor. Assume
that the wholesale electricity market is reorganized so that there is some
reasonable chance of making a profit by building new electric generating
plants in Russia. Would an investor be more likely to put money into a
nuclear plant or a natural gas generator?
In the U.S., there is no doubt. Natural gas turbines are state-of-the-art
in electricity generation. They are a superior investment to coal units almost
universally and overwhelmingly dominate nuclear power because of its
regulatory debilities. While the regulatory climate in Russia is much more
favorably disposed to nuclear power, our assessment is that even in Russia
nuclear power will lose out among investors to natural gas generation. Based
plainly on the economics, gas-fired generation will dominate nuclear power.
We come to this conclusion based on our estimates of the full cost of
electric power. The cost of electricity in Russia from a new nuclear
generator is 4.8¢/kWh while a natural gas generator needs only 4.2¢/kWh to
recover its cost. Moreover, the natural gas estimate assumes that fuel for
these generators is priced at the current export level so the gap between
nuclear power and natural gas generation is not a result of gas subsidies.
Even if the assumptions underlying the cost estimates are changed in
ways that favor nuclear power, given the huge investment cost of a nuclear
reactor and the obvious uncertainties in the legal and property rights system,
it is hard to imagine that Minatom will find it easy to attract foreign
investment for nuclear generation ventures. Gas is too cheap, the generation
technology is too simple, and the risk exposure is so much less.
Recognize that for either of these technologies, the current wholesale
price of electricity in Russia is but a trivial fraction. Without significant
reform in the sector, no form of electric generation capacity is a good
investment. The wholesale electric market must be restructured in order to
keep the lights on in Russia. But even if reform is able to increase rates to
levels that reflect the true cost of production, expansion of nuclear capacity
is still a questionable entrepreneurial venture.
Nuclear Power Plant Construction⎯International
Regardless of the economic efficiency of nuclear power in Russia,
Minatom is actively promoting nuclear power plant construction internationally. Currently, there are Russian nuclear power construction projects un-
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derway in Iran, China, India. It is very unlikely that these projects would
float on their own bottom as private-market economic ventures.
By our estimates, the base construction cost in Russia of a VVER1000 plant is $2.2 billion including the interest cost during construction.
Our comparison of this cost to the amounts that Minatom is reportedly receiving for these construction activities suggests a significant shortfall.
In China, Minatom is involved in the construction of two VVER1000s. The total project is valued at $3.2 billion. Russia is supplying the
technology and the reactor. China is responsible for construction and installation. Russia is to receive $2.4 billion of which it is providing long term financing for $1.3 billion at an interest rate of 4 percent. This interest rate is
too low; it does not adequately cover the risk of such a project. In addition,
we know that Russia is providing some of the construction financing. The
stated contract price barely covers the estimated cost of the equipment cost.
Given what appear to be the financing terms, this construction venture is not
a profit-making enterprise.
The Indian project also involves two VVER-1000s units. The total
cost of the project is set at $3 billion. Russia is responsible for the design
and 90 percent of the construction and materials at the announced contract
price of $2 billion. The apparent shortfall may be explained on the basis of
lower construction costs in India than in Russia, but it is unlikely that the reported contract price is sufficient to offset the actual cost.
Finally, there is the Iranian reactor at Bushehr. In 1995, Russia agreed
to complete construction of this facility and install a VVER-1000 for a cost
of $800 million. The plant reportedly will be completed in 2002. It is not
clear whether the fee has escalated over time. If not, it is too low. Also, there
is talk of building three additional units at this site for an additional cost of
$1.2 billion each. Again, by our estimates this is well below the full cost.
Nuclear Fuel
Minatom is engaged in a number of nuclear fuel projects. In addition
it is exploring the possibility of becoming a global spent fuel repository.
Russia is a major world supplier of nuclear reactor fuel. Expansion of nuclear fuel projects is one of Minatom’s strategic goals.
By our estimates, Russia currently sells over $1 billion worth of nuclear fuel per year. Part comes from enrichment of natural uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel. Part comes from a joint project with the U.S. called
the HEU deal.
The HEU deal is a project under which Russia down-blends highly
enriched, weapons-grade uranium into nuclear fuel and then sells this to the
Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs
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U.S. The original terms of the deal called for payments of $12 billion over
20 years. Some $2 billion has been paid to date. However, given the current
world price of nuclear fuel and the incentive structure of USEC, the U.S.
agent in charge of the purchases, the terms of the payments are likely to
move against Minatom. Nonetheless, the HEU project will remain a major
source of hard currency.
Nuclear fuel enrichment services are an important cash generating activity for Minatom. However, the expansion of fuel initiatives beyond the
ones that are currently profitable is problematic. These new projects include
MOX fuel fabrication, refitting VVER plants to burn MOX, and spent-fuel
storage, among others. Both the MOX fabrication and refitting projects must
be considered speculative because they are based on Russian technologies
that are as yet unproven. This does not mean that the technologies are unlikely to perform, but that extensive and costly research must be done before
these projects can be implemented. Even then, most studies indicate that
MOX is not economically efficient compared to enrichment of natural uranium, even including the savings in storage of nuclear wastes. Funds for the
projects are not obviously available in Minatom’s budget and promises of
international funding have not materialized.
The spent-fuel project is somewhat further along. Initial testing was
completed at the Mayak facility in 2001, but a number of hurdles remain,
including quieting political pressure from grass-roots organizations throughout Russia that are opposed to turning Russia into a nuclear waste repository.
It is worth noting that these groups have some legal forces on their side because Russian law prohibits the importation of nuclear waste for purposes of
permanent storage. However, the slit in the tent through which the camel’s
nose has appeared is the claim that spent fuel will be imported for reprocessing purposes. Minatom claims that nuclear waste storage could become a lucrative business venture, which may be true if the nuclear nonproliferation issues are sufficiently discounted.
Privatization
Privatization of the Russian nuclear sector poses a number of questions and concerns from the perspective of nuclear nonproliferation. Some
are obvious: Private ownership of nuclear activities will create the incentive
to breach nuclear material control protocols in order to make a profit. This
threat exist even now. Its extent is unclear but troublesome.
However, there are other aspects of the problem that may be even
more of a threat. The routine of privatization in Russia over the last decade
is corruption and asset shifting. Should privatization of the atomic energy
Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs
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industry follow the same pattern, siphoning of cash from atomic enterprises
increases the potential for disaster in the maintenance and control of nuclear
material. Moreover, nuclear enterprises are a ripe fruit for corruption: Most
nuclear enterprises have high front-end investment costs where questionable
procurement practices can be used to divert cash to insiders. And once in
operation, nuclear facilities such as nuclear power plants have low operating
costs allowing for cash to drain away without immediately upsetting production.
Privatization in other sectors of the Russian economy, and especially
in the energy sector, has been a vehicle for corruption and asset shifting. If
funds from the cash generating activities of Minatom are diverted into private pockets, the likelihood of financial crisis within Minatom will be significantly heightened. In the event that privatization breeds corruption,
money from U.S. initiatives in Russia that comes with oversight and control
will be even more crucial in steadying the course of the ministry.
Conclusions
Based on our analysis, Russia’s nuclear sector is steaming into an uncertain economic fog and very possibly toward the shoals of financial distress. We draw this conclusion from our review of the restructuring of the
Russian energy sector, restructuring within Minatom, and its own nondefense business enterprise initiatives: electricity generation, nuclear power
plant construction, and nuclear fuel processing.
Reform of the energy sector may yield benefits for Minatom in the
short run but will expose the nuclear sector to the harsh realities of competition in the long run. Hopefully, reform of the wholesale electricity market
will result in cash flows sufficient to provide adequate maintenance so that
the existing plants will continue to produce. However, it is possible that the
cash flows will not be large enough to allow for major upgrades in equipment. Considering both capital and operating costs, nuclear power does not
look particularly attractive from an investment perspective compared to
other energy options even if wholesale rates increase to cost-recovery levels.
The fundamentals of nuclear power that confront Russia domestically
are also at play internationally. Although Russia is engaged in several power
plant construction projects, they are of dubious value. The terms under
which these projects are engaged do not appear to be cost effective. It appears that Russia has agreed to build these facilities at a loss. Possibly this
was done to pursue foreign policy objectives. Possibly, this was done to gain
a presence in the international nuclear construction market. At all events,
Minatom will have to charge more in the future to make these ventures a
Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs
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commercial success. Finally, the nuclear fuel processing business is unlikely
to generate as much revenue in the future as it has in the past.
For all of these reasons, it is likely that the U.S. initiatives that provide
Minatom with hard cash will have greater leverage over the next five to ten
years. If Minatom is not able to raise significant funds from private investors
and if privatization has the all too common effect of diverting cash into private pockets, the money from U.S. sources with its attendant oversight will
become increasingly important in achieving U.S. national security goals.
This money helps directly to control nuclear proliferation, and it helps to
stabilize the Russian economy through the nuclear sector, which comprises a
substantial portion of the energy resources of the country. Taken as a whole,
the picture is one in which the value of U.S. hard-cash infusion into Minatom will likely have an important stabilizing effect on the operation of the
atomic energy sector and produce spillover benefits throughout the Russian
economy.
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II. INTRODUCTION
This research studies the impact of the institutional restructuring of Russia's nuclear sector on the nuclear nonproliferation goals and objectives of the United States. The
basic hypothesis is the following: Reform and especially privatization in Russia is
changing the economic incentives and will change the future behavior of the key organizations in the energy sector. Investigation of these changing incentives and the underlying economic forces will offer a clearer understanding of the future behavior of Russia's
Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). Our focus is on the restructuring and reform
within Minatom as well as restructuring that is occurring broadly across the energy sector
because the behavior of all of these enterprises is interrelated.
Minatom is a large and powerful political and economic force in Russia. Minatom
controls all of the nuclear activities in Russia. These include nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel reprocessing, and certain other nuclear technology initiatives, in addition to the
maintenance and control of nuclear weapons. Over one million people are said to be
linked to Minatom.
In the years since the breakup of the Soviet Union, there has been a movement
towards privatization of industries and business activities. In the early 1990s, most of the
assets of the non-nuclear electric system were transferred to the joint-stock enterprise,
Unified Electric Systems of Russia (UES). The same thing happened in gas and oil. Gazprom is a joint-stock enterprise that owns the majority of the Russian gas reserves and the
gas pipeline system. These joint-stock companies are chartered corporate entities and although the federal government stills holds a large interest, individual claims exist that are
publicly traded, and there is some foreign investment and ownership.
Even the nuclear sector has had some privatization and more is expected. Some
units of Minatom have been made joint-stock enterprises. In some cases, the stock is 100
percent owned by Minatom, but in others, some portion of the shares are privately held.
While these shares are not publicly traded and currently there is no foreign ownership,
some units have become accounting centers where private individuals have claims to the
cash flows. Moreover, it seems clear that Minatom is positioning itself for privatization
efforts that will include direct foreign investment in some of its business ventures.
The fortunes of Minatom are clearly linked to both the privatization efforts in the
rest of the energy sector and to reforms within Minatom. It is reasonable to expect the
actions and behavior of these entities to be dependent on their organizational structure,
especially to the extent that there is explicit potential for economic gains and losses to
private individuals.
The fortunes of Minatom are not certain. There is no guarantee of fiscal stability
for this ministry in the face of reform and restructuring in the electric and gas industries.
There is a basic instability in the energy sector as a result of competitive restructuring
that can cause Minatom to either profit wildly or to verge on financial catastrophe. Privatization of Minatom will heighten this effect, and in the event of financial distress, privatization will undoubtedly induce more reckless behavior both financially and in the control of nuclear material.1
1

In financial economic terms, privatization will lever the claims of the shareholders and create a
bet-the-ranch incentive in the event of financial distress.
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A. An Example of the Issues
The economics of nuclear-powered electric generation highlights our research.
Minatom has set a course towards the promotion of nuclear power both within Russia and
internationally. The plan is elaborate and extensive as discussed in detail in the next section. Even so, there is a fundamental question of its viability. Is nuclear power economically efficient? Will Russia be able to make a profit from building nuclear plants in other
countries? Are new technologies in nuclear power generation and fuel processing economically viable? Could reform of the gas industry cause nuclear power to fail the market
test in the face of cheaper natural-gas combined-cycle turbine power plants? How will
reform in the electric industry affect cash flows and investment in nuclear power?
At bottom, the answers to these questions will impact the behavior of Minatom
toward the United States and its nuclear nonproliferation initiatives. If Minatom founders
on the rocks of market competition in its nuclear power expansion program, it will be
much more sensitive to U.S. programs that channel hard cash to its departments and divisions. On the other hand, if the nuclear power enterprises prosper, Minatom will be less
dependent on the revenues flowing from U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs. Understanding the underlying economics of restructuring and privatization at Minatom will
help assess the cost effectiveness of the many nuclear nonproliferation initiatives.

B. Issues in Privatization
Privatization of the Russian nuclear sector poses a number of questions and concerns from the perspective of nuclear nonproliferation. Some are obvious: If privatization
takes the form of numerous semi-autonomous departments organized as joint stock enterprises (enterprises with some private and some government ownership), the private owners will have the incentive to breach control protocols on nuclear material in order to
make a profit. The extent of this threat even now is unclear, but troublesome.
However, there are other aspects of the problem that may be even more of a
threat. The routine of privatization in Russia over the last decade is corruption and the
stereotype is Gazprom. Gazprom is a joint stock company that owns the majority of the
nation’s gas reserves and the transportation pipeline system. While government entities
including the federal government own a substantial proportion of Gazprom stock, actual
control of the company was captured by top management and through Byzantine business
arrangements substantial wealth was transferred to private hands. Only this last summer
was an attempt made to bring the financial dealing within Gazprom under control.
Should privatization of the atomic energy industry follow the same pattern, siphoning of cash from atomic enterprises must spell potential disaster in the maintenance
and control of nuclear material. Moreover, nuclear enterprises are a ripe fruit for corruption: Most nuclear enterprises have high front end investment costs where questionable
procurement practices can be used to divert cash to insiders. And once in operation, nuclear facilities such as nuclear power plants have low operating costs allowing for cash to
drain away without immediately upsetting production.
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One of the most disquieting issues that has come to light in the privatization area
is the change in ownership and control of the financial institutions that are closely aligned
to Minatom. Until recently, Konversbank handled Minatom’s financial activities and was
owned and controlled by Minatom. That has changed. Konversbank has been taken over
by MDM-bank. Moreover, it is not completely clear who owns MDM. Some reports
claim that it is owned by foreign-chartered stock companies controlled by powerful Russian businessmen and substantial foreign investment. Clearly, foreign involvement at any
stage of decision-making and management control within Minatom or its financial agents
increases the risk of nuclear proliferation.
The nuclear industry is fundamentally different from oil and gas. The oil and gas
industries are based largely on natural resource endowments that are valuable in the
ground. Economists call their value “rents” because the income flow that they generate is
not directly linked to production. No matter who gets this income, the value is still there,
production still occurs, and consumers can enjoy the output of the industry.
Nuclear production is not like this. The nuclear industry is a manufacturing industry. The natural resource value of nuclear products is small relative to the value added
by processing. To be useful, natural uranium has to be enriched. For enriched uranium to
be valuable in producing energy it has to be carefully handled and employed in a technologically sophisticated power plant. For the power plant to work efficiently, it must be
constructed with precision and properly maintained. In this setting, the income flows
from the output of the production activity must be plowed back into the production process. There are few rents. Most of the money generated by nuclear enterprises must be
spent on the real resource suppliers that join in the production process. Otherwise, production stops, or worse yet, catastrophically malfunctions. This threat of corruption in the
nuclear sector does not exist in natural resource industries.

C. Objectives of the Research
The rest of this document attempt to analyze the fundamental economics of the
nuclear industry in Russia. Our basic conclusions are that the industry is in a financially
precarious position. It is possible that the energy market place could shift in a way that
makes nuclear energy a truly viable enterprise. However, it is at least as likely that the
shift could go the other way. And either way, the nuclear business is not ever likely to be
a money machine from which top managers and insiders can load their pockets. To the
extent that privatization is potentially linked to corruption in the Russian nuclear sector, it
is a very serious threat from a nuclear nonproliferation perspective and for the stability of
the country in general.
Russian leaders including President Vladimir Putin and Minatom chief Alexander
Rumyantsev have repeatedly stated that the restructuring of Minatom is intended to make
it attractive to foreign investors. Even so, privatization and foreign investment in the Russian nuclear sector is set against the backdrop of the fundamental economic enterprises of
the nuclear ministry. Minatom is wagering its future on three basic non-defense business
ventures––nuclear power production, nuclear power plant construction, and nuclear fuel
initiatives. Each of these are questionable in their own right and especially so in the light
of the changing institutions in the Russian energy sector.
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III. OVERVIEW OF MINATOM
A. Organization of Minatom
The industrial activities of Minatom can be classified into three broad areas: nuclear power, nuclear fuel, and weapons.
·
·

·

The Nuclear Power Complex is comprised of several departments that are coordinated directly by the
Minister of Atomic Energy. Rosenergoatom and Nuclear Facilities Construction are the most important. Rosenergoatom coordinates the operation of the nuclear power plants (NPPs).
The Nuclear Fuel Complex includes the following programs: fuel for atomic power, NPPs nuclear fuel
cycle development, promising technologies, high energy physics, controlled thermonuclear fusion
and plasma physics, radiation safety, nuclear material production and utilization, nuclear fuel storage and reprocessing services export development.
Nuclear Weapons Complex is responsible for development of the nuclear weapon complex, supervision of armament program, nuclear ammunition and disarmament, special nuclear and non nuclear
materials, military nuclear installations, international cooperation in the military field, etc.

Discussions of privatization of Minatom have centered on separating the Nuclear
Weapons Complex from the other two. Two years ago, the former Minatom chief,
Yevgeny Adamov, advanced a plan to transform Minatom into two entities. The cash
generating entities, which are the power plants, power plant construction, and nuclear
fuel reprocessing activities along with some other nuclear technology initiatives, would
become a private corporation. National laboratories and defense facilities would form the
Minatom “holding company” while all Minatom commercial business comprised in nuclear fuel complex and nuclear power complex would constitute a separate institution,
called “Atomprom.”
Adamov’s main objective was to gain a better control over financial flows of the
commercial enterprises of the ministry, including the semi-independent generation concern Rosenergoatom and to use part of the revenues from Atomprom in funding the nuclear weapon complex and research laboratories that were in financial distress. The possibility of transforming Atomprom in a private entity a later date was not excluded.2 The
possibility gave rise to speculations regarding the status of nuclear power generation
companies because current Russian law prohibits private ownership of nuclear power
plants.
Even after Adamov was replaced by new minister Rumyantsev his proposals were
not entirely abandoned. In particular, the consolidation of the nuclear enterprises in one
company was strongly advocated by Minatom officials during the discussion of the reform of power sector last year despite the opposition of UES. On September 10, 2001
prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov signed a order by which Rosenergoatom is reorganized
in a single nuclear business entity, and the plan is moving ahead.3 Also, President Putin
2

VEK, No.30, July 28, August 30, 2000.
The company will subordinate the nuclear power plants Balakovo, Beloyarsk, Bilibino, Kalinin,
Kola, Kursk, Leningrad (currently managed by Minatom), Novovvoronetz, and Volgodonnsk (Rostov). The
company will also incorporate the directorates of power plants construction and associated nuclear enterprises such as ATOMENERGOREMONT that produces equipment and spare plants for nuclear power
plants, ATOMTECK ENERGO the provides research and technical safety assistance to Rosenergoatom,
3
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has signed a decree providing for the integration of Russian nuclear fuel manufacturing
and supply enterprises, in particular TVEL and Techsnabexport.4 The capital of TVEL
will be increasing by issuing additional shares that will be bought by the Property Ministry. This procedure will “enhance the efficiency of the state regulation of Russian nuclear
fuel cycle enterprises and increase in the competitiveness of nuclear fuel provided by
TVEL on nuclear fuel market” according to a spokesman for Putin.5
The three main revenue generating activities of Minatom are electricity generation, nuclear fuel processing and construction of nuclear power plants. Russia has contracted to construct NPPs in several foreign countries. These include Iran, India, and
China, in addition to the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union.
There is also the possibility of revitalizing joint construction ventures with North Korea.
In the past, the U.S. has raised objections to the Russian construction projects in Iran, India, and North Korea because of nuclear proliferation concerns. Minatom has plans to
build several new nuclear plants in Russia over the next several years. These efforts will
focus on completing the projects that are underway.
Russia is a major player in the nuclear fuel market. Russia enriches natural uranium and re-processes spent fuel, and then sells this to nuclear power plants primarily in
Europe. Russia is also engaged in a fuel processing agreement with the United States in
which the U.S. buys Russian nuclear material that has been down-blended from weaponsgrade uranium to fuel-grade material. This agreement is called the HEU deal. The project
has its own set of problems, but nonetheless it is on going and provides substantial revenues to Minatom. From 1995 to 2000, Russia has received nearly $2 billion under the
auspices of this agreement.6 The annual revenues generated from nuclear fuel sales including the HEU deal are around $1 billion.
Russia is also involved in several new nuclear fuel projects. Recently, national
legislation was passed that paves the way for Russia to become an international center for
storage of nuclear waste. Minatom claims that this project can produce substantial revenues, which it might if it is able to resolve the nuclear proliferation concerns and receives
the support of the U.S. Russia is also exploring technologies in reprocessing the plutonium in spent nuclear fuel so that it can be reused as fuel in the form of mixed uranium
and plutonium oxides (MOX). This would be sold in western Europe and potentially used
in refitted eastern European and Russian power plants. All of these projects are in the
early planning stages and it is not clear that any are truly commercially viable.
The various activities of Minatom can be outlined in the following way:
·

Fuel Projects

-

Uranium Fuel Exports
• Processed from Natural Uranium
• Reprocessed from Spent Fuel
• Down-blending from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU Agreement)
Plutonium Processing
• Weapons-Grade Production

VNIIAS, the research institute for nuclear plant operation. Power in Eastern Europe, 66, 17 September
2001, page 16. See also, ITAR-TASS, November 11, 2001, BBC Monitoring.
4
WNA news from NucNet Business News, 80/01, 11 September.
5
Power in Eastern Europe, 66, 17 September 2001, page 16.
6
From the GAO report on the HEU project, Table 1 and p. 13.
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•
•
•
·

MOX Reprocessing from Weapons-Grade Material
MOX Reprocessing from Spent Fuel
Plutonium Output from Breeder Reactors

Nuclear Generation Construction Projects

-

Plant Construction
Breeder Reactors
• Larger Breeders that Start with Uranium
• Breeders that Start with MOX
Use of MOX in Conventional Reactors
• Conversion of VVER Reactors to MOX
• Development of New Designs (GT-MHR) that Use MOX

The outline highlights the interrelated nature of these fuel and construction projects.

B. Strategic Goals & Budget Projections
1. Strategic Goals
Regardless of whether privatization of Minatom is expanded or contracted, the
agency is locked in government policy debates concerning its own reform and that of the
other players in the energy sector, UES and Gazprom. A synthesis of Minatom’s stated
plan for the future and interviews with Atomic Energy Minister Rumyantsev give the
following picture.7 The prime tasks are to:
1) Secure the nuclear weapons complex and strengthen the country’s strategic military potential. This implies increasing the state control over enterprises in Minatom complex.8
a) Increase of state control in some joint stock enterprises.
b) Consolidation of small enterprises.
c) Transformation of some joint stock enterprises into state enterprises.
2) Expand the role of nuclear energy in Russian energy strategy over the next
20 years.
a) Expand the share of nuclear energy in the domestic energy supply
at expense of gas.
b) Construct new nuclear generation facilities and recondition existing facilities in Russia
c) Increase capacity utilization.
d) Development of new nuclear power and fuel technologies.
3) Expand construction of nuclear plants internationally.
7

Strategy of Nuclear Development of Russia in the First Half of XXI Century prepared under the
leadership of former Minister Adamov.
8
This suggests that parts of the Minatom complex are out of control. Possibly, this is true and
there is evidence; possibly, these statements are made to posture the Minatom leadership so that reforms
can be undertaken with less political resistance.
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There are also several reform issues:
4) Restructuring Minatom and potential privatization of nuclear industry.
5) Reform in the Russian energy sector and its impact on nuclear power generation and on generation and fuel initiatives.
6) Nonproliferation initiatives and development of the industry.
Minatom is pressing for reform in both the electric and gas industries. In particular it wants to see price reform in the regulated electricity and gas monopolies. Russian
gas prices lie below those in Western Europe and those that Gazprom charges to its export consumers. Domestic gas tariffs are set at about one tenth of export prices and until
recently only some 45 percent were paid in cash. The same distortions are encountered in
electricity pricing. Industrial electricity tariffs are about one sixth of average rates in
OECD countries. Residential rates, cross subsidized through higher industrial tariffs, are
about 40 percent lower.
Minatom’s proposal is for long-run reform of the energy sector so that it is made
up of competitive markets with independent producers and non-discriminatory third party
access to gas and electricity supply systems. This implies significantly reducing the cross
subsidies implicit in the electric and gas prices. The recent legislative decree on electric
industry restructuring mandates exactly this, but its implementation is potentially contentious.
2. Budget Projections
Table 1 gives a breakdown of Minatom’s budget for 2001 and 2002, which high-

lights its various commercial activities.9 The categories are somewhat general. Figures
are in millions of U.S. dollars.
Fuel and construction projects are budgeted at $2.3 billion in 2001 and $2.5 billion in 2002. The construction projects in India and China were specifically funded out of
the Russian Federation budget at $140 million per year. A breakdown of funds by type of
activity is not available. Based on these numbers, fuel and construction activities account
for around 55 percent of Minatom’s budget while electric generation makes up nearly 40
percent. A major source of cash to Minatom is the HEU agreement with the U.S. There
are a number of other fuel initiatives that are at various stages of development. Some of
these involve development or redesign of nuclear generation facilities.

9

This budget outline was obtained through personal correspondence with staff at the U.S. Department of Energy.
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Table 1: Budget for the Ministry of Atomic Energy
Year:
1. Electric energy production and selling 1
2. External commercial activity

2

3. Credits for NPP construction in India and China
4. State budget funding

2001

2002

1570

1800

2200

2400

140

140

210

250

90

110

4210

4700

3

4

5. Commercial activity of Minatom's entities and organizations
at the internal market
($US millions)

TOTAL

1
It is planned that actual payment for the produced and delivered electric energy in 2001 will constitute about 90
percent (incl. 77 percent in cash) and 95 percent (90 percent in cash) in 2002.
2
List of external commercial activity: Natural and enriched uranium; Uranium enrichment services and reprocessing (conversion) of triuranium octoxide into uranium hexaflouride; Recycled uranium enrichment services;
Reenrichment services of uranium tails; Fuel deliveries for nuclear reactors; Irradiated nuclear fuel management
services; Contaminated metals, metallic constructions and equipment reprocessing services; Services for development and design of atomic reactor components and systems; Radioactive and stable isotopes; Ionizing radiation
sources, labeled and deuterated compounds; Calcium metal, zirconium and other metals and alloys used in the
atomic power industry; Charged particle accelerators, gammaradiation units; Special electronic and physical
equipment and devices; Flaw detectors; Medical radiological equipment; Processing, laboratory and special protective equipment and instruments for the enterprises of the atomic industry; Construction of nuclear power plants
in Iran.
3
Funding from the RF State Budget.
4
Includes nuclear weapons research, development and fabrication; fundamental research; target-oriented federal
programs; and nuclear power plant construction in Russia.
Source: U.S. Department of Energy
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IV. COST ESTIMATES OF NUCLEAR POWER
The first step in assessing the business fortunes of Minatom is an analysis of the
economics of nuclear power. As shown in Table 1, electric generation sales make up
nearly 40 percent of the Minatom’s budget. Moreover, a sizeable portion of the rest of the
budget comes from the construction of nuclear power plants at home and internationally.
As a consequence, an estimate of the cost of nuclear electric generation is essential.
In this section we present preliminary estimates of the cost of nuclear power as
well as the most competitive generation alternative––natural-gas-fired combined-cycle
turbine generators. We focus on this comparison because these are likely to be the ultimate investment alternatives for private foreign capital.
Our estimates start with an OECD study that projected the cost of electricity generation using various technologies and factoring differing international conditions.10 The
study is comprehensive and has been updated several times. We modify some of the assumptions used by OECD based on data obtained from U.S. sources, and we cross-check
the OECD assumptions from other international sources.11 Several of our estimates are
corroborated by statement from Minatom officials. While our analysis is detailed, more
extensive investigation of the cost of nuclear power is required before definitive conclusions can be drawn.
We give estimates of the cost of electricity generation broken into capital and operating costs. The cost figures are expressed as cents per kilowatt hour. These are the tariffs that the owner of a generator would need to receive over the life of the facility in order to make the project a break-even venture at the start of construction. This is called
“levelized cost” in the literature. Costs expressed in this way mean that we have calculated the wholesale price of electricity necessary to cover the construction and operating
cost of a generator based on the expected life and annual output of that unit.
Estimates both for Russia and the U.S. are presented for purposes of comparison.
The estimates are given in U.S. currency denominations.

A. Assumptions Underlying the Cost Estimates
There are three assumptions that affect cost in a generic way. They are the discount rate used to assess the project, the expected life of the generation facility, and load
factor under which the generator will operate. The OECD study used two different discount rates, 5 and 10 percent. We concentrate on the 10 percent discount rate, which we
10

See OECD (1998). The data were obtained by circulating a questionnaire to OECD Member
countries and non OECD participant countries through IAEA. “In addition to numerical data, the questionnaire sought qualitative information such as lists of elements included in the cost estimates and country
specific accounting methodology that may impact cost and thereby explain significant differences among
countries in the cost of generating electricity.” (p. 21)
11
Until recently, data on the operation of electric generators in the U.S. was reported to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on what was known as Form 1. We have these data for the year 1996
and use them to estimate the operation and maintenance cost of nuclear power plants in the U.S. Also we
obtained data on the construction of new, non-regulated power plants in the U.S., called merchant plants,
from the Center for Energy Studies at Louisiana State University. These data were used to corroborate the
OECD estimates of the cost of new gas-fired combined-cycle turbine generators.
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use for both the U.S. and Russian estimates. Certainly 5 percent is too low in the context
of attracting private investment.
We modified the operating life and load factor assumptions somewhat for each of
the two different technologies. Based on our analysis of the U.S. data and discussion with
U.S. electricity experts, we projected the useful life of natural gas turbines to be 25 years
and the capacity utilization to be 75 percent. For nuclear units, based on the international
experience, nuclear generators are being retired or substantially refitted after 30 years, on
average. Also, based on the U.S. operating data, we estimated the capacity utilization of
nuclear units to be 79 percent. In the U.S., the nuclear refuel cycle is longer than one
year. Even so, we estimated that each unit is down about 10 percent of its fuel cycle for
maintenance, repair, and refueling. When the unit is up and running, daily, weekly, and
monthly consumption cycles cause it to run at less than full capacity. As a result, the capacity utilization when running is around 88 percent. Thus, the overall capacity utilization is 79 percent. While Russian nuclear units in the past have not been achieving this
level of capacity utilization when running, one of the goals of Rosenergoatom and Minatom is to increase capacity utilization in this dimension.12
1. Nuclear
The typical construction cost for a nuclear unit is 5-9 years. At a 10 percent discount rate, interest cost during construction represent 25-30 percent of the total construction cost of a nuclear unit.13 Decommissioning cost amounts to 2 percent of the cost. The
cost of this operation are estimated at $105-370/kW in the OECD study. Particular to nuclear power plant construction cost structure is a high level of constant costs, independent
of plant size or life of the plant, for the project implementation. The OECD cost study
refers to activities such as site approval, information and public relations, training the operation and maintenance personnel, licensing and activities of the supplier such as safety
analysis, documentation and project management. These costs are about 30 percent of the
total capital cost of a one unit nuclear power plant of 1200MW according to some
sources.14 However, this percentage seems exaggerated based on U.S. experience. For the
U.S. nuclear plants building and structure costs were 23 percent of the total and equipment was 77 percent.15 Land costs were negligible. These costs include financing during
construction.
Construction cost is related with the number of units to be built on a site. “The
cost reduction is calculated to be 10 percent for a site with two units and 20 percent for a

12

In general, nuclear power, as expected, is more competitive at lower discount rates while low
capital options such as gas-fired plants increase the competitiveness at higher discount rates. Capital intensive options are more sensitive to load factor variation than low capital-intensive options. Generally increases in lifetime decreases average levelized cost. However this may not be true if fuel prices are assumed to increase rapidly in the long run. For gas fired power plants, capital share represents only a small
share of levelized costs; therefore increasing lifetime has little influence on generation costs. Moreover if
the prices are assume to increase significantly levelized cost increase when lifetime is extended.
13
Bertel and Stevens (1998).
14
Ferroni, Kirchhof, and Heredia, (1998).
15
For plants in the lower 25 percentile of cost, which are mostly plants built before 1974, the
equipment cost was 72 percent of the total.
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site having 4 units provided that the construction interval is less than 2 years.”16 A similar
phenomenon exists for scale effects in the size of the unit. The OECD nuclear power cost
estimates are based on a generator size of 604 MW. The standard Russian unit is 1000
MW. We use a 20 percent scale factor to project the OECD cost estimates to 1000 MW
units. That is, we assume that there is a 20 percent cost saving as plant size increases.
This is roughly based on the scale factors observed in U.S. construction costs across all
types of generators.
The main factors that influence operation and maintenance (O&M) costs are technical performance of the nuclear power plant, safety regulation and manpower costs prevailing in different countries. O&M cost varies significantly from country to country. The
reasons for this disparity have been analyzed in a NEA study (1995). The conclusion was
that a large portion of the disparity is due to a lack of harmonized methodology for calculating these costs.17 Safety regulations also have a substantial impact especially when
safety regulations are in flux. Refueling outage is another key parameter. The average
today is 50 days and “it keeps getting shorter.”18 Repair cost (not including manpower
cost) seem to have a high share in the O&M cost. At least in Japan, from 1985 and 1995
it comprised about 60 percent of the O&M.19
In the OECD cost study there are several things covered in O&M for both the
U.S. and Russia. These include operation, site monitoring, maintenance (materials, manpower, services), engineering support staff, administration, operation waste management
and disposal, safeguards. Items covered only in the U.S. estimates: general expenses of
central services taxes & duties (plant specific) insurance (plant specific). Items in Russian
estimates only: support to regulatory bodies. Major refurbishment is not included in either
set of estimates.
The front end of the fuel cycle cost is made of the costs of uranium mining and
milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. Back-end of the fuel cycle cost include, storage, conditioning and disposal of spent fuel for open fuel cycle or reprocessing
and disposal of high level waste for closed fuel cycle.20 The most important components
of fuel costs are uranium, uranium enrichment and reprocessing. From 1984 to 1994 there
was a 40 percent reduction in nuclear fuel cycle costs according to NEA estimates.21 Due
to improved fuel performance and lower price of uranium and enrichment services enrichment prices have decreased by 30 percent between 1985 and 1990 and the trend is
expected to continue. Also “drastic uranium price increase does not appear very likely in
the short term owning to the existing excess inventories of fissile materials.”22 The estimated fuel cost according to the 1994 OECD/NEA study was 0.47¢/kWh. This was based
on a cost of natural uranium of $50/kgU; conversion, $8/kgU; enrichment, $110/kgU; and

16

Id.
Id.
18
Pryor (1998).
19
Kunitake, Nagano and Suzuki (1998).
20
In the closed fuel cycle case credits for recycled uranium and plutonium are deduced from overall fuel cycle cost. There are arguments that open fuel cycle is the most economic alternative for utilities,
but it is more likely that MOX imposes even greater financial penalties on utilities due to safety restrictions
on fuel burn-up. MOX limits the capacity at which plant can operate.
21
Bertel and Stevens (1998).
22
Id.
17
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fuel fabrication, $275/kgU.23 The OECD 1998 annualized cost estimates for fuel cost for
Russia was .485¢/kWh and 0.581¢/kWh for the U.S. Cost for interim fuel storage as well
as the storage of conditioned low and medium waste is estimated to be $133/kW.24 Under
different regulatory regimes the back-end costs can have a considerable influence on
overall fuel cycle cost.
In order to cross check the numbers in the OECD study, we estimated the operation and maintenance cost data for most of the nuclear power plants in the U.S. using the
FERC Form 1 data for 1996. Our estimates of O&M costs were 41 percent higher than
those of the OECD.25 We used our estimates in projecting the costs for the U.S. and also
increased the projected operation and maintenance costs for Russian units by this same
proportion.26
The OECD study referenced the capital cost of nuclear plants in the U.S. Since
there are currently no nuclear plants under construction in the U.S., nor plans for any in
the immediate future, this number is largely moot. However, we did project the capital
cost of nuclear plants to the present time based on the capital cost of the nuclear plants
built in the U.S. between 1965 and 1972 which were in the lower 25 percentile of costs
for all nuclear plants currently operating in the U.S. This number was considerably higher
than the OECD estimate. Again this number has no direct impact on our analysis because
nuclear power in not of immediate policy concern in the U.S.
2. Natural Gas
For combined-cycle natural gas units built in the U.S., we are able to independently corroborate the capital cost assumptions used in the OECD.27 The OECD estimate
of capital cost for gas units for Russia is higher than that for the U.S., but this can be reasonably explained based on the fact that the U.S. is the world leader in natural-gas turbine
development and production. Nonetheless, it is also reasonable to expect that competition
internationally is likely to push the capital cost of natural gas turbines in Russia down
toward the cost in the U.S.
The O&M estimates for gas turbines was cross checked against the FERC Form 1
data for combined cycle turbines, regular turbines, and conventional boiler units. In 1996,
there were not many combined-cycle units in operation in the U.S. reported as such on
Form 1, but the cost data that is available is consistent with the assumptions of the OECD
23

OECD/NEA, The Economics of Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Paris, France, 1994 cited by Ferroni,
Kirchhof, and Heredia. This implies a burn rate of around 35,000 MW days per ton.
24
Ferroni, Kirchhof and Heredia.
25
Our estimates are consistent with the actual estimated average generation cost reported by the
Nuclear Energy Institute for U.S. firm between 1998-2000. These range between 1.27 for the first cost
quartile and 2.46 for the last cost quartile, in mills per kWh. These estimates are similar to ours. We account for load factor in estimating operating costs to make it applicable to the OECD levelized cost methodology. Source: ‘www.nei.org/documents/Production_Cost_Quartiles.pdf’.
26
The OECD study assumes that the Russian non-fuel O&M cost of a nuclear plant is the same as
that of a gas turbine. In the U.S. based on utility reported data, we know that the nuclear O&M cost is over
six times as large. Hence, some adjustment of the OECD assumptions is necessary for Russia.
27
Based on data obtained from the Center for Energy Studies, Louisiana State University, for new
merchant plants built in the last several years.
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study.28 The reported O&M costs in the U.S., excluding fuel, were slightly lower than
those reported in the OECD study. The OECD assumptions give higher Russian O&M
costs for gas turbine units than U.S. The cause of this difference is not immediately obvious because we expect that labor costs are lower in Russia. However O&M costs are so
low on these units that the issue is not crucial.
For gas turbines, fuel is the largest cost share. The OECD study makes various assumptions about fuel cost escalation over the life of the plant and discounts those changes
back to the present. We modify this assumption. We make alternative assumptions about
the cost of fuel and hold these constant over the life of the plant. This is the simplest way
to consider alternative scenarios about the natural gas deregulation that is occurring in
Russia.

B. Cost Estimates
The estimates are given in Table 2. A quick review shows that the lowest cost
electricity is generated by natural gas turbines in the U.S.; these units have a levelized
cost of 2.9¢/kWh. This projected cost for the U.S. is roughly consistent with historical
experience over the last several years. The fuel cost for these plants accounts for approximately two-thirds of the unit cost of output. The U.S. fuel cost component is based
on the November 2001 spot price for natural gas in the U.S. and the heat/energy conversion factor (.55) for the turbine units currently being installed in the U.S. today.29 Table 3
shows the effect on the fuel cost component due to changes in the price of fuel and the
thermal efficiency of the turbine. Increasing thermal efficiency from 55 to 60 percent decreases the unit cost of electricity by $1.5/MWh. At the same time, if the price of natural
gas were to stabilize at its highest level over 2001, the fuel cost of electricity generation
would increase from 1.8¢/kWh to 5.7¢/kWh. If natural gas prices were to sustain at these
levels in the U.S., nuclear power generation might reemerge as a power source. Indeed,
when natural gas prices reached these levels during 2000, there was discussion of expanding nuclear capacity in the U.S.
In Russia, natural-gas electricity generation costs are estimated to be 4.2¢/kWh.
The baseline case in Russia is built on the assumption that deregulation of the natural gas
industry will drive up the domestic price of gas to equal the export price. The Energy Information Administration reports that the export price of natural gas from Russia is approximately $4/Mcf.30 This compares to $3/Mcf currently in the U.S. The domestic price
in Russia is one-tenth of the export price and it is this domestic price that domestic electric generators are now paying. However, deregulation of the natural gas industry is unfolding and it will certainly drive up the price of gas, especially the gas prices paid by
electric generators. In Table 2, we show a cost scenario where we assume that the price of
gas only rises half way from its current domestic level to the current export level. This
28

We compared combined-cycle units to other units in the U.S. based on capacity utilization and
size. Turbines have relatively low O&M costs excluding fuel compared to conventional units. For the average size unit and at 75 percent capacity utilization, O&M cost is .2¢/kWh. This is about one-third of the
same cost for a coal unit.
29
Thermal efficiencies come from GE, the manufacturer of most commercial turbine generators in
the U.S.
30
Russia, Restructuring the Gas Sector, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia.html.
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yields an electricity price of 3.2¢/kWh. Table 3 shows different scenarios concerning gas
prices and thermal efficiencies. At the current natural gas prices and our guess about the
thermal efficiency of the existing electricity generators in Russia, we estimate the fuel
cost of electricity to be .4¢/kWh and the full O&M cost to be .82¢/kWh.
The full cost of electricity generation from natural gas units is estimated to higher
in Russia than it is in the U.S. Part of this difference is based on the cost of the turbines
themselves. The OECD study assumes the cost of turbines to be 66 percent higher in
Russia than the U.S. No doubt this difference existed in 1998 when the OECD study was
last updated and may still exist; however, it will disappear over time. We can expect the
price of turbines in Russia to fall toward the cost paid by electric generating companies in
the U.S. This is especially true if Russia is able to attract foreign investment into the
electricity generating industry. Table 2 also accounts for this scenario. If the price of turbines falls in Russia to the U.S. level, the capital cost of gas-fired generation will decline
from 1.4¢ to .9¢/kWh and the full cost from 4.2¢ to 3.7¢/kWh assuming that natural gas
is priced at export levels.
Next, consider the costs for nuclear power. We show estimates of the cost of nuclear power in the U.S. for comparison purposes only because there are no nuclear power
plants currently under construction or in the planning stage in the U.S. Two different cost
scenarios are given. In the baseline case, capital cost per kWh is the average cost experienced by U.S. utilities in nuclear power plant construction between 1965 and 1974. It was
after 1974 that regulatory delays began increasing construction costs dramatically. We
inflated these historical capital cost numbers by the producer price index to 2001 dollars.
Alternatively we use the capital cost assumptions adopted in the OECD study, which assessed the capital cost of a nuclear plant in the U.S. to be lower than in Russia. O&M
costs including fuel are based on data reported by U.S. utilities in the operation of nuclear
plants in 1996.31 The projected total cost of nuclear power in the U.S. ranges between
7.6¢ and 4.9¢/kWh. Even given the lower capital cost assumption, nuclear power falls far
short of the economies of gas turbines, especially given current gas prices in the U.S.
However, as noted above, if gas prices were to sustain at the highest levels reached in
2000, nuclear power would become attractive.
The projected cost of nuclear generation in Russia in the baseline case is
4.8¢/kWh. We adopt the OECD assumption concerning capital and fuel cost. We increase
the Russian nuclear O&M costs by the same proportion that the OECD understates U.S.
nuclear O&M cost. This increases O&M from .45¢ to .58¢/kWh, which is still substantially less than the U.S. and hardly a significant factor overall.
The main cost of a nuclear plant is the construction costs. The OECD study places
Russia slightly above average, world-wide in terms of the capital cost of nuclear plants.
As shown in Table 3, the OECD estimate for the capital cost of a U.S. nuclear plant is
$2064/kW; in Russia, it is $2448/kW.32 The main source of this difference is the interest
cost during construction. For comparison purposes we estimate nuclear generation costs
in Russia based on the OECD projected capital cost in the U.S. This low capital cost scenario is 4.1¢/kWh. Also, the OECD estimate is based on a 604MW unit. We scale this

31

Because the fuel cycle makes so much difference in the reported O&M cost, we econometrically
took this into account based on the number of hours of the year the plant was down for maintenance.
32
By comparison, the cost for a gas turbine in the U.S. is $510/kW.
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estimate up to 1000MW, which is the size of the standard unit being built by Russia today. This scale effect lowers the full, levelized cost of the unit over its life to 4.5¢/kWh.
Table 2: Comparison of Power Plant Construction & Operating Costs (¢ /kWh)

Assumptions
Gas
Life

Nuclear

25

30

Capacity Utilization

75 %

79 %

Interest Rate

10 %

10 %
Russia

United States

Capital Cost

1.42

.86

Operation & Maintenance Cost excl. Fuel

0.42

0.20

Fuel Cost

2.39

1.80

TOTAL

4.23

2.86

Low Capital Cost

3.66

Low Fuel Cost

3.16

Combined-Cycle Natural Gas

Nuclear
Capital Cost

3.75

5.71

Operation & Maintenance Cost excl. Fuel

0.58

1.32

Fuel Cost

0.49

0.58

TOTAL

4.82

7.61

Scale Effect

4.46

Low Capital Cost

4.08

4.91

Notes: All costs are cents per kilowatt hour. Estimates are based on adjustments to the OECD study of the
cost of electric generation internationally. Capital cost per unit are the discounted cash flow over expected
life and capacity utilization necessary to pay back construction, interest, contingency, and
decommissioning expenditures. Natural gas fuel costs for gas turbines are based on thermal efficiency of
.55, and gas prices of $2.9/MMBtu in the U.S. Gas price in baseline case in Russia is $4/MMBtu.

C. Comparison Summary
The cost estimates shown in Table 2 paint an interesting picture. By almost every
measure, natural gas turbines are a more economical technology for electricity generation
in Russia than nuclear power. In the baseline comparison, nuclear generation is over 10
percent higher than the projected cost of gas generation in Russia. The same thing is true
if we compare the low capital cost scenarios. In the low gas-cost case, gas turbines are
substantially cheaper regardless of the capital cost of nuclear plants.
The bottom line is simply this: Across a wide variety of assumptions it is obvious
that nuclear power is not a clear winner in the horserace of economical efficiency in
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electricity generation. Indeed, it is very likely a loser and may be a distant second depending on the wholesale price of natural gas. The only circumstance in which nuclear
power turns out to be a lower cost alternative than gas turbines is if the interest rate at
which the capital cost is discounted is set arbitrarily low. This circumstance is inconsistent with the object of attracting private foreign investment into the nuclear sector.
Table 3: Electric Generation Cost¾Major
¾
Underlying Assumptions
Russia

United States

Base Construction

$721/kW

$422/kW

Construction Interest, etc.
TOTAL

$126/kW
$847/kW

$45/kW
$510/kW

Base Construction

$1521/kW

$1441/kW

Construction Interest, etc.

$927/kW

$623/kW

TOTAL

$2448/kW

$2064/kW

Capital Cost
Combined-Cycle Natural Gas

Nuclear

Fuel Cost
Natural Gas

Price/Mcf

Russia:

Export Price (2001)
Domestic Price (2001)

United States

Spot Price Nov 2001
High Price in 2000

@
Thermal
Efficiency
$3.96/Mcf 55%
$.42/Mcf

$2.98/Mcf
$10/Mcf

= Electricity
Fuel Cost
$23.88/MWh

55%

$2.56/MWh

35%

$4.02/MWh

55%

$17.96/MWh

60%

$16.46/MWh

55%

$56.87/MWh

Notes: Nuclear capital cost based on OECD assumptions. Other costs included in Construction Interest
category are contingency (not part of cost for combined-cycle plants in Russia), major refurbishment (for
U.S. only), and decommissioning. Conversions: $/MWh = 1000 ´ ¢/kWh; Btu/kWh = 3412; and there are
1030 Btu’s per cubic foot of natural gas. Thermal efficiency is rate at which an electric generator converts
fuel energy into electric energy. Scaling Russian nuclear capital costs from 604MW to 1000MW lowers
the unit cost from $2448/kW to $2213/kW.
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V. ECONOMICS OF MINATOM
A. Electric Power
1. Estimated generation costs
Electric energy sales generate a large portion of Minatom’s budget¾over a third.
Even so, nuclear generation is arguably a money-losing proposition. The current wholesale electricity price is approximately 1.1¢/kWh and was only .74¢/kWh in 2000. Estimates shown in Table 2 and corroborated by statements from Rosenergoatom officials indicate that the operation and maintenance cost of a nuclear power plant in Russia is
around 1.1¢/kWh, of which fuel costs are about half.33 Based on this evidence nuclear
power plants in Russia were losing money in 2000 and are just barely recovering the full
O&M cost of production in 2001.
Table 4 shows nuclear power generation for the last several years including the estimated amounts for 2001. The average electricity prices are also given. For 2000, the
retail price of electricity nation-wide was 1.5¢/kWh; the average wholesale price was
.74¢/kWh. For 2001, the projected electricity revenue from the U.S. DOE, which is $1.6
billion, implies a wholesale electricity price of 1.1¢/kWh. This is in line with recent reports that say “rates for Rosenergoatom electricity have risen by 54 percent in the first
half of 2001.” 34 This gives a tariff of 1.14¢/kWh.
Table 4: Tariffs & Minatom Estimated Revenues From Nuclear Power Generation

Nuclear power generation (billions kWh)
Average retail price (¢/kWh)
Estimated revenues at the retail prices
Average wholesale price on FOREM
charged by nuclear generators (¢/kWh)
Estimated revenues with wholesale prices
DOE Estimates

1999
111
9.6
1,065
0.54

2000
129
1.3
1,671
0.74

2001
137
1.48
2,055
1.14*

2002
-

605

915

1,562
1,570

1,800

Sources: EcoTass 26/2001,"Nuclear power plants to produce 137 bln kWh in 2001"; U.S. Department of Energy, private correspondence with authors, August 2001; UESR Annual report 2000,
Section: Export of Electricity; Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, February 26, 2001; and FT
Energy Online, Power in Eastern Europe "Lenergo receives rave Q1 reviews", 11/06/2001.
* Based on reports for first half of 2001.

Some supporting evidence is found in the following statements: “On 25 January,
Deputy Atomic Minister Bulat Nigmatullin told Prime-TASS that the tariffs on electricity
33

“At an AES, 1,000 kW/hr costs 352 rubles (R), and at a GRES [State Regional Electric Power
Station]–an average of R366.” Rosenergoatom Executive Director Yuriy Yakovlev quoted in Moscow
Kommersant in Russian 11 Sep 01 P4 by Irina Rybalchenko: "Rosenergoatom Gets Additional Powers". At
an exchange rate of R29.5 to $1, this is the equivalent of 1.1¢/kWh.
34
Novaya Gazeta, Energy and Metals Round Up, November 15 2001, (from FBIS).
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generated by nuclear plants shall be raised 1.6 times because the tariffs do not cover a
plants' basic costs.”35 Based on a tariff of 0.54¢/kWh this statement implies a tariff of
1.4¢/kWh to cover the “basic costs”. Arthur Andersen in its April 2001 Russian Electricity Sector Reform report about UES tariffs said, “Substantial increases in tariffs, 1.5x2.5x measured by actual exchange rates, will be required to make essential new, privately-financed investments economic” (p. 7).
Given that the operating cost of Russia’s nuclear facilities is 1.1¢/kWh and the
wholesale price was only .74¢/kWh in 2000, nuclear power lost money over the year. It
appears that rates in 2001will turn out to be higher, but it is still clear that nuclear power
is at best treading water in the ocean of electric generation. How can this be? How can
the nuclear power plants not receive enough revenues to cover their costs or at best barely
do so?
Basically, the most likely explanation is that the energy sector has never really
made the transition to a true market economy. Clearly since the currency crisis of 1998,
the energy sector has been operating on a system of debit exchanges, with a large sprinkling of barter thrown in. This so-called non-payment problem pre-dated the currency
crisis but itself became a crisis afterwards. The non-payment problem is beginning to resolve itself and this is moving along with restructuring of the wholesale electric market.
In the height of the non-payment problem, it is likely that the costs of the nuclear
plants that were not covered by revenues were simply washed through the rest of Minatom’s budget. For instance, if the nuclear plants did not get paid for the power that they
produced and sold to UES, then they did not have the currency to pay Minatom for the
fuel that they used. Certainly, the fuel cost and probably a good bit of the other O&M
costs of the nuclear facilities are goods and services supplied by Minatom. Hence, these
intra-agency transfers are carried on the books without the exchange of actual cash. Minatom supplies Rosenergoatom and takes what revenues for these services as it can get.36
Another possible answer to the question of how can these shortfalls exists is that
the facilities themselves are not being adequately maintained. This answer is much more
disquieting than the first. Regrettably, there is some evidence that it is the case. Activists
in favor of shutting down the Leningrad nuclear power plant cite evidence that there have
been numerous safety violations there.37
In any case, the implications are discouraging in terms of the economic vitality of
Minatom. Even though electricity sales make up a large share of the overall Minatom
budget, electricity is not a cash cow. Our conclusion is that unless reform in the electricity market increases tariffs, nuclear power sales will not generate enough money into the
future even to properly maintain the nuclear plants much less offer support to any of the
other ventures of Minatom.

35

RFE/RL( Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) News Line, Russia, 26 January 2000.
One place to look to pursue this point further is the Leningrad Power Plant which was not part
of Rosenergoatom in the past. A check of its accounting if available should reveal how these exchanges of
materials and services were accomplished.
37
Environmentalists Claim LAES Is Unsafe, By Galina Stolyarova, St. Petersburg Times, Aug 3,
2001.
36
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2. Increasing Revenues Through Exports
One avenue to increase revenues may be international sales. Minatom is actively
pressing to sell more electricity outside of Russia. It has been engaging a long-running
battle with the electric grid operating company, UES, which also owns most of the conventional generators in the country. UES is unwilling to allow Minatom to independently
market power for two reasons. First, UES wants to have nuclear power capacity at its
disposal in satisfying domestic demand. This is valuable because UES does not always
pay 100 percent hard currency for the nuclear power that it takes. Second, to the extent
that excess capacity exists inside Russia, UES would like to be able to sell this power internationally on its own account.
For the most part the nuclear power plants supply power to grid which is controlled by UES. UES buys this power from the plants and pays for it with some hard currency, some barter, and some promissory notes. The proportion of hard currency has been
growing over the last few years, but Minatom still argues that UES pays it a smaller percentage of hard currency than UES collects from electricity consumers. It is true that the
cash revenue has tripled since 1998 and up to 75 percent of electricity output is now paid
for in cash. Even so, “the nuclear industry is insisting on 100 percent payment, just as
UES ultimate customers are now paying in full for electricity they receive.”
Furthermore, Rosenergoatom claims that UES owes it R12 billion (approximately
$410 million) through 2000 plus at least R3 billion more in 2001. It was recently reported
that Rosenergoatom would begin imposing restrictions on the supply of electricity to the
UES.38 Restructuring and repayment of this debt is an important issue to Minatom. UES’s
debt to Minatom accounts for approximately 10 percent of the total accounts payable of
UES.39 In June 2001 the government announced that was preparing a debt restructuring
agreement between UES and Rosenergoatom. The debt would be restructured over a period of 4 years. Renaissance Capital Investment fund speculated that “the terms are likely
to be favorable to UES, as government has traditionally sided with UES in past disputes
between the company and Rosenergoatom.”40 However, the past may have less predictive
power now as reforms continue to rock the energy sector. In the last few disputes, Rosenergoatom has fared well against UES. Recently, UES has promised Rosenergoatom
that it will pay R8 billion by the end of the year.41 Rosenergoatom declared in October
that it intended to sell R15 billion of the debt owed to it by UES.42
One of the main reasons that Minatom is pushing for consolidation of the nuclear
power plants into one more centrally controlled agency is the nonpayment issue.
Another is to gain greater freedom in reaching outside markets by open access across the
electricity grid.
It was recently reported that Rosenergoatom plans to export electricity to Georgia,
Finland and Ukraine.43 But UES is the administrator of the grid and has been granted by
38

July 3, 2001, ITAR-TASS in Russian from FBIS.
See UES Annual Report, Balance Sheet of RAO “UES of Russia”
40
Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, Monday, June 18 2001, “Government to restructure
UESR debt.”
41
Vedomosti, 13 November, cited by FBIS, Energy and Metals Roundup, November 13, YeES
Promises To Repay Debts to Atomic Energy Ministry
42
Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, October 30, 2001.
43
Interfax Daily Financial Report, July 4, 2001.
39
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law the exclusivity of the electricity export contracts. It refused to provide Rosenergoatom with transmission and dispatch services for the contract with Georgia. In response
Rosenergoatom filled a complaint with the Anti-Monopoly Ministry. In August the Anti–
Monopoly Ministry ruled that UES is guilty of violating anti–monopoly laws for the refusal to honor Rosenergoatom contract. UES declared that it would appeal the decision at
Moscow Arbitration Court. If arbitration court confirms Ministry of Monopoly ruling it
means the UES monopoly over exports will be abolished. Rennaisance Capital analysts
predict that UES will win.44 However, UES has since proposed to Rosenergoatom a 15-40
percent shareholding in a joint electricity export operator suggesting that management at
UES is not so sanguine.45 The proposal has been not received with too much enthusiam at
Rosenergoatom.
Nonetheless, Russian electricity exports are small and Rosenergoatom’s capacity
to take away a significant share of them is considered by industry analyst limited due to
“the lack of relationships abroad, general entry barriers for Russian electricity, and UES’s
political connections both domestically and abroad.”46
In the discussions on the industry restructuring UES and Minatom are at odds not
only on the issues concerning non-payment and grid access but also on the structure of
ownership of the Federal Network Company and of Trading System Operator (TSO). The
TSO is to be established as a non-commercial entity, comprised of wholesale market participants, in charge of conducting the operations in the wholesale market in the next
years. UES claims it should have a 50 percent ownership in TSO. Rosenergoatom and the
large industrial customers argue that n o market participant should have more than 25
percent in TSO. UES argues that the Federal Network Company, the system operator and
deficit energos should be represented in TSO supervisory board while Rosenergoatom
argue that they should be excluded as they are controlled by UES and this will allow UES
to maintain control over the financial operations of the wholesale market. The resolution
seems to be that UES will have 50 percent ownership in the TSO until the end of 2002
after which its shareholding will be reduced to 25 percent. 47
Rosenergoatom concluded an export contract with the German company RWE to
supply 900 million kilowatt hours to Georgia in July-December 2001. Similarly, it plans
to sign a contract to supply electricity from Kola Nuclear Power plant to Finland. For this
it will be necessary to increase the capacity of first and second power producing units at
the plant from 400 to 500 MW. In a similar move, Rosenergoatom also plans to sign a
contract to export electricity to Ukraine in volumes of 700 million kWh per month contingent on the synchronization of the Russian and Ukrainian electric systems (which was
done in August 2001).
In spite of the recent reports about Rosenergoatom signing contracts for electric
power supply to international customers, it is not clear that it will be able to conclude
these contracts despite the recent ruling against UES of Anti Monopoly Ministry. It is
44
45

Morning Monitor, November 1, 2001, page 1, “UESR, FEC Clash Over Electricity Exports.”
Morning Monitor, November 13, 2001, page 9 “UESR, Rosenergoatom May Form Joint Export

Operator.”
46

Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, September 19 2001, “UESR appeals Anti Monopoly
Ministry ruling.”
47
Renaissance Capital, Morning Monitor, Monday, October 1, 2001, “UESR Approves TSO Role,
Appoints New Deputy CEO” and Renaissance Capital, Research Note, November 2000, “UESR Board
Meeting- Positive Results.”
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possible that the political and institutional barriers that have stopped these initiatives in
the past have been swept away in the electric industry restructuring decree, but it is not
certain.
Even if UES monopoly is ended and bilateral contracts are allowed it is still possible that these contracts will not generate a significant flow of revenues in the future because:
a) “Expansion of Russian electricity exports to the CIS states is being held back by
their limited effective demand, while exports to countries further afield are restricted by transmission capability.”48
b) Rosenergoatom lack contacts abroad and expertise in export of electricity.
c) The export tariffs are only slightly above domestic prices and not all of the sales
are paid for in cash.
In order to have an idea over the potential exports market open to Rosenergoatom
let us take a look at the Russian current export of electricity conducted through UES. In
1999 and 2000 UES exported electricity in CIS to Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine and
Georgia and in several other states, mainly Turkey, Poland, Latvia, Poland and Finland.
Table 5 shows the exports.
Table 5: Export of Electricity from Russia
1999
2000
Energy Supplied
Paid
Energy Supplied
Paid
Millions Millions Total
Currency
Millions
Millions Total
Currency
of kWh
$US
of kWh
$US
7989.6
165.1
203.2
19.8
8567.3
141.4
175.0
45.9
981.1
20.6
23.7
22.3
4481.8
70.9
69.8
69.3
8971.0
185.7
226.9
42.1
13049.1
212.3
244.8
115.2

CIS
Other
Total

Source: UES Annual Report, 2000, Export of Electricity

In 1999, UES generated 602.2 billion kWh and 622.8 billion kWh in 2000. The
UES revenue from power generation was $7.5 billion in 2000. So exports accounted for
about 0.2 of the total UES revenues. About 90 percent of the UES exports are in CIS
states. All of them are heavily indebted to UES and several times the delivery of energy
has been halted because of the non payments. This is shown in Table 6.
However, these countries are important because through their grid transits the energy delivered to other states such as Turkey through Georgia, Ukraine to Central and
Eastern Europe (in 2000 the countries signed an agreement concerning the coordination
of export to Eastern and Central Europe), Belarus to Poland. Based on the export date
offered by UES in the annual report, the average export tariff charged by UES for the
electricity exports is calculated and shown in Table 7. The tariff can help us figure out the
potential revenues that Rosenergoatom stands to gain from electricity exports.

48

UES, Annual Report 2000, Export of Electricity.
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Table 6: Indebtedness Of Neighboring States To Various
Suppliers For Electricity ($US millions)
Country:
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Ukraine
Total

Debt as of
Debt as of
January 2000 January 2001 Difference
39.5
22.2
-17.3
46.4
46.5
+0.1
413.5
414.3
+0.8
83.8
54.7
-29.1
582.8
537.7
-45.5

Source: UES Annual Report 2000, Exports to CIS states

As can be seen in Table 7, the export tariffs that UES is receiving are higher than
the domestic wholesale prices, but they are still well below the full cost of producing
electricity. This means that these sales are not likely sales of firm power. In other words
this is mostly off-peak power that the supplier can curtail as needs be. The buyers are
using it as backup to their own power sources, and as a consequence it sells for less than
the full cost of baseload power.
Table 7: Export Tariffs ($/kWh)
Country
Kazakhstan
Belarus
Ukraine
Georgia
Turkey
China
Latvia
Finland
Poland
Average

1999
0.019
0.02
No delivery
0.018
No delivery
0.019
0.021
0.0194

2000
0.015
0.016
No delivery
0.017
No delivery
0.018
0.023
0.015
0.012
0.0165

Source: Calculated from data in UES Annual Report, 2000

a) Conclusions about Exports
The bottom line is that Minatom would like to gain more control over the disposition of nuclear power and do so in a way that will allow it to increase the cash flows from
these assets. Nonetheless it faces significant political and technical barriers. Moreover,
based on the export revenues that UES reports over the last two years, the revenues available in the export market are not in and of themselves sufficient to support expansion of
nuclear generation capacity.
The export market alone will not solve the problem of inadequate wholesale tariffs. Foreign power sales imply that there is some excess capacity in the Russian system
in some regions and at some times. Even so, it is not possible economically or politically
and probably not feasible physically that the grid operator will allow electricity to flow to
foreign countries if there are domestic power shortages that could be assuaged by this ca-
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pacity. Ultimately, the only solution to the problem is increased domestic prices. Possibly, but not certainly, the evolving reform of the wholesale electric market will yield this
result.
3. Reform of the Electric Market
On July 11, 2001, the federal government passed a decree on restructuring the
electric energy sector.49 The decree is ambitious verging on heroic. It sets a time-table and
steps to be taken in the reform. The time-table calls for competitive markets to be in place
in three years. The objective is to bring competitive markets to all of the energy industries, electricity, gas, oil, and coal; to create an open financial environment that will encourage and foster private investment; and to revamp regulatory oversight by reducing
the power of the local political fiefdoms. In fact, President Vladimir Putin is being
blasted by political opponents for stripping local governments of power.50 Nonetheless,
this is exactly what other commentators have argued is necessary to make the country
attractive to foreign investors.51
The goals or “keys to success” identified in the decree are many. The most notable are: creation of competitive electric power markets; creation of favorable conditions
for new construction and operation of new capacity in generation and transmission of
power; phasing out the cross subsidizing of various regions and groups of electric power
consumers; creation of a support system for low-income population strata; and demonopolization of the fuel market for thermal power plants. These goals are notable not
only because they are Herculean but also because some imply significant reform in other
sectors of the economy. For instance, to say that the fuel industry will be “demonopolized” is to say that much the same reform proposed in the electric sector will be
undertaken in the coal, oil, and gas industries.
Of course, major reform of the private sector implies major reform of the public
bodies overseeing the sector. The decree calls for the creation of a new system of regulation to guide the industry under the new economic conditions. This means clarification of
the status, jurisdiction and “order of business” of the various government entities with
regulatory authority over the sector.
a) Wholesale Price Increases
As we have discussed above, wholesale rates are substantially below the full-cost
recovery level. Wholesale rates need to go up five fold to put them in the range of our
estimates of cost. This is a substantial increase. It will create a lot of shock waves
49

Decree No 526 on reform of the electrical power industry. An unofficial translation is available
at: ‘ues.elektra.ru/en/reform/show.cgi?110701post.htm’.
50
Moscow, Aug 3, 2001, (Agence France Presse) “The leader of Russia's main opposition communist party lashed out at the government Thursday.”
51
Bureau of Economic Analysis Foundation, Moscow, Analytical Bulletin #17, 1999. This document claims that the local governments offer little property right protection to foreign investors. A recent
example from the news is the case of the bailout of the Gus-Khrustalny Quartz Glass Plant by the American
Sawyer company. Sawyer claims to have put $7 million into the bankrupt plant; on August 1, 2001, a federal arbitration court upheld a lower court ruling that voided Sawyers contract and essentially expropriated
its investment.
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throughout the economy. It is not likely to happen quickly. In May 2001, the Minister of
Economic Development and Trade, German Greff, announced that electricity tariffs
would only grow by 100 to 120 percent through 2004.52
By and large the current level of wholesale prices is a result of the deep subsidies
in the domestic gas market. Domestic gas prices are one-tenth of the export prices. Domestic gas prices have been around $15 per 1000 cubic meters (103m3) while export
prices range from $130-$150/103m3.53 Assuming that UES is paying the domestic price
for gas for fuel at its power plants, the fuel cost of a conventional generator would be
around .4¢/kWh. Adding in non-fuel O&M costs would give a variable cost of somewhere around the current wholesale price.
Obviously, this situation cannot continue forever. The average, annual wholesale
price of electricity must be high enough to support the construction of new generating
units. The wholesale domestic price of natural gas is expected to increase based on the
restructuring that is being undertaken in the gas industry. This will necessarily drive up
the price of electricity. However, the wholesale electricity price must increase even more
to account for the capital cost of new generation capacity. This margin is lacking in the
current wholesale rates and it must begin to be recovered in the near future or the lights
will begin to go out in Russia.
Higher electricity prices will be good for the electric industry but they will impose
pain on consumers, and cross subsidies that have existed in the past will be narrowed or
erased. Reform and restructuring of the electric sector will undoubtedly run into trouble
as the cross subsidies in rates are reduced and eliminated, but the nuclear power sector is
least likely to be adversely affected by the social problems that could easily plague the
rest of the reform in that sector. Since the nuclear power sector sells only wholesale
power it will not be directly involved in these tariff reform squabbles. Nor is it likely to
bear more than its pro-rata share of any life-line tax that is imposed to maintain some
level of subsidy to selected customers.
b) Distribution of Revenues
The decree on restructuring of electric industry is very explicit in terms of the nuclear power plants. It says, “The reform process will … includ[e] reform of federal, state
unitary nuclear power enterprises” and that this reform will take the form of establishing
one generating company.54 Consolidating the control of the various nuclear power plants
is something that Minatom has been promoting for several years. On September 10, 2001,
the government issued such an order (Government Directive 1207-r) which was a major
step toward implementing restructuring. The directive orders atomic power plants to be
transformed into branches of the Unified Generating Company (EGK) Rosenergoatom as
it will be called.55
The directive creates a unified generating company in Rosenergoatom. This is
specifically what atomic energy producers had insisted on. This will significantly
52
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strengthen the positions of atomic power producers on the energy market. Until this order, all atomic power plants were said to be financially independent and were subordinate
to Rosenergoatom only in questions of security. The agency did not have any means of
control over the plants. “A unified generating company, with a unified tariff, will make it
possible to consolidate all financial currents within [Rosenergoatom].” However, sources
in Minatom say that the coordination of legal questions may take up to 2 years.56
In spite of this directive, it is not perfectly clear how Rosenergoatom will itself be
organizationally positioned. Several possibilities present themselves: One is that a single
nuclear generating company, call it Rosenergoatom, is formed and that this company is
autonomous from Minatom. Another is that this company would be a subsidiary of Minatom. A crucial issue is the control of the revenues flowing to the nuclear generating
company from the soon-to-be competitive sales of electricity in the wholesale market.57
The question remains of how much control Minatom will retain over the nuclear generation facilities as the electric industry restructuring unfolds. It is possible that under the
power generation restructuring plan Rosenergoatom will end up completely independent
of Minatom.
Such an autonomous Rosenergoatom could conceivably have power over revenue
flows that would reduce the discretion of Minatom even if Rosenergoatom were still
forced to buy fuel and nuclear engineering services from Minatom. For instance, a financially autonomous Rosenergoatom could arguably change the rate at which the nuclear
power plants are refueled. Extending the life of the fuel assemblies would reduce the cash
flow to Minatom and could upset its plans for fuel reprocessing. Similarly, an autonomous Rosenergoatom could side-track some of Minatom’s planned technological changes
in fuel processes, such as conversion of the VVER reactors to use MOX fuel. Furthermore, if Rosenergoatom is fiscally separate from Minatom, who would make decisions
about investment in nuclear power plants? If Rosenergoatom is fiscally independent from
Minatom, it is quite possibly that it will choose to refurbish existing plants as opposed to
build new ones, even ones that are already partially constructed.
However, it seems more likely that Minatom will be in direct control of the unified nuclear power concern. This is reinforced by statements from Rumyantsev: “We will
be able to accumulate more funds for development, to enhance the safety of our plants, as
well as to build new power generating units.”58 The claim by Minatom is that the unified
nuclear generating company would concentrate the financial resources from the enterprises in its hands and also could help reduce the current production costs. Even so, it re56
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mains problematic whether even the cash flows to nuclear power plants enjoyed in a
competitive wholesale electric market will be substantial enough in the long run to support reconditioning of old generators and construction of new ones.
Underlying the public statements is the hope that as a unified enterprise, revenues
from nuclear power can be increased. It is likely that as unitary enterprises, each nuclear
power plant sells at a different tariff because their average costs are different. The hope is
that the unified tariff Rosenergoatom will secure will be higher than the average of today's tariffs. In the process of lumping together the cost estimates of all nuclear plants
Rosenergoatom will have some margin to inflate costs more than individual power plants
are able to secure. And the lobby to set a higher tariff is likely to be more effective.
Part of the truth probably lies in the arguments proffered by Minatom. Some
plants incur losses, some do not. Rosenergoatom will be able to shift revenues from
plants that make some positive margins in order to cover some basic maintenance and
investment expenditures at the others. This possibility is limited when plants are managed
independently; plants that enjoy a positive net margin use this for their own needs.
Also, before the reorganization each plant was a separate legal entity. After the
reorganization they are not anymore. So all their contracts likely will be concluded in
centralized fashion by Rosenergoatom. This, on one hand, will allow Rosenergoatom to
have a better control over the revenues from electricity sales; (it is likely that some portion of them were diverted inside each power plant possible to management, laborers,
etc.). On the other hand, by this measure Minatom mainly prepares a strong future position for nuclear generation in the liberalized market. Rosenergoatom is expected to be a
big player able to influence the wholesale market. The whole strategy of massive investment in new generating capacity, despite the poor economics of nuclear generation, correlated with their dramatic efforts to increase the market share is oriented in this direction. Using its political lobby Minatom is trying to get big fast, before the market is liberalized, so it is able to exercise whatever market power it can muster to increase its revenues. The claims of reorganization––better management, economies of scale, better investment decisions, better safety––are, in part, arguments used to win the political battle.

B. Nuclear Power Plant Construction¾Domestic
¾
Nuclear power provides about 15 percent of Russia’s power today. Minatom
hopes to expand this to 20 percent over the next 7 years. To do so, it anticipates building
four more nuclear plants and refurbishing several of the existing reactors. However, unless the wholesale price of electricity increases significantly, construction of new facilities will not be a profit-making venture.
Based on the cost estimates presented in Table 2, natural gas electric generation is
cheaper than nuclear power based on operating expenses and the full recovery of the
capital cost of a new facility. The full-cost-recovery price for nuclear power is 4.8¢/kWh
while natural-gas-fired generation costs 4.2¢/kWh. Is also important to note that the comparison is done at 10 percent discount rate. Renaissance capital analysts estimated that an
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appropriate rate for Russia would be 25 percent.59 At a higher discount rate the competitive edge of gas is even more apparent.
Minatom has long argued that the most profitable strategy is to export natural gas
to western Europe and produce electricity in Russia using nuclear fuel. Historically, natural gas sales to western Europe have been impeded by minimal pipeline capacity. Recently, plans have been made to increase capacity in order to move natural gas westward.
However, the estimates presented in Table 2 assume that gas is priced at the current export level. Competition in the gas market and increased exports to western Europe
can only cause this price to fall.60 Hence, the price comparison between gas and nuclear
electric generation shown in Table 2 is the most favorable estimate for nuclear power.
Based on this, it is reasonable to predict that the competitive wholesale price of electricity
will not be high enough to justify the construction of a new, “green-field” nuclear power
plant in Russia.
While a completely new plant might not be economically justifiable, it is likely
that the four commercial reactors under construction will be finished.61 A large part of
their construction costs have already been expended, the marginal payoff from the money
spent finishing them is high. Assuming that reform and competition does bring higher
electricity prices, Minatom will gain some additional revenues by completing these
plants.
Consistent with this, in 2001, Minatom allocated $137.6 million for the completion and start up of Rostov-1 and for work at Rostov-2, $3.4 million for the completion of
Kalinin-3, has also allocated $200 million for building other reactors over the next three
years ($60 million in 2001, $100 million in 2002, $40 million in 2003).
Similarly, increases in the wholesale electric price may afford revenues to allow
for the refurbishment of the existing nuclear power plants. While the economics of reconditioning existing nuclear plants is idiosyncratic, as a general rule, reconditioning is
likely to be cheaper than new construction. Minatom has spent $35 million to for a major
back fitting of Leningrad-4 reactor.62 Projections have $14 million allocated in the Federal Budget in 2002 for operations to extend the operating lifetimes of Novovoronezh-3
and -4.
Regulatory agencies both within Russia as well as outside monitors will likely
force expenditures to be made on the old NPPs or they will be forced to shut down. One
environmental group has been set up specifically to scrutinize the Leningrad plant.63 This
plant is scheduled for international inspection 2002 and there are some issues that must
be addressed. Hence, if the Leningrad plant or any of the other older facilities are forced
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to close because of the expense of upgrading the facility it implies that few if any new
nuclear construction will be initiated.64
Finally, the new nuclear technologies that are in various stages of development
including the BN-800 and BREST-1200 breeder reactors, conversion of the VVER reactors to MOX fuel, and the GT-MHR, are all unlikely to move forward rapidly. Minatom
announced in February that plans to construct the Beloyarsk-4 BN fast reactor will be
“actively restarted” in 2001 and that around $21 million have been set aside to get the
construction started.65 It also announced that it will allocate $17 million in 2002 for the
construction of Volgodonsk-2.66 However, these sums are small relative to the cost of
completing these projects. While there has been some interest expressed by the international community, funds have flowed slowly and clearly the U.S. will be a major force in
making anything happen. Any significant amount of funds that are generated within Russia or any private investment that ends up in the nuclear generating sector will almost
certainly go to the more conventional projects.
Minatom claims that Russia is making a structural shift towards nuclear power,
and that the government is determined to promote nuclear power plants. 67 Recently Minatom reported to the Duma that Russia will commission 10 nuclear units in the next 10
years and another 6 in India, Iran and China. However, there are voices in the Russian
government and Russian public opinion that have started to question the viability and
cost competitiveness of nuclear power option. An audit at Rosenergoatom, recently made
public, addressed the issue of economic soundness of nuclear energy. We are not aware
of the audit conclusions but the Comptroller Office statements has confirmed our assumptions that the cost estimates pushed by Rosenergoatom are unlikely to be sound.68
The operations of nuclear plants are a spider web of barter arrangements and low liquid
promissory notes. More, in a recent interview with Rosenergoatom President, Erik
Pozdyshev, we admitted that under “normal cost assumptions” nuclear power cannot
compete with gas.69 While Minatom strongly lobbies the government and regions to support nuclear power generation, is very likely, especially after the onset of the reform,
utilities and UES will devote efforts to dispel Minatom claims regarding the alleged superiority of nuclear power.
Is interesting to see the investment in generating capacity of UES.70 In 2001, UES
began pushing the so called “5000 MW” plan, 12 projects that it hopes to sell with help
of PricewaterhouseCoopers to international investors. It will be interesting to follow how
the plan unfolds. If international investors are reluctant to invest in new conventional capacities, which are almost certainly gas plants, how likely is they will put money in nu64
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clear power plants and what chances has Minatom to attract foreign investment in nuclear
power generation?
Also, in its attempt to secure more budgetary funds Minatom is playing a risky
game. Minatom publicly asserts that it needs funds to increase the safety of the nuclear
reactors. First it needs funds to repair and upgrade the old reactors to alleviate safety
problems that are the result of design inadequacies. Second, in an attempt to take advantage of the terrorist concerns in Russia it is trying to obtain funds to increase the antiterrorist protection of nuclear plants and sites. While the strategy may work in the short
term it will result in increased the public opinion awareness of the safety and maintenance problems of nuclear plants.
There are good reasons to believe there are genuine concerns about the safety of
the nuclear sites. A Russian magazine asserted that “Several sector officials propose
leaving only the reactors as state property and ‘exchanging’ all the rest of the infrastructure for investment money. They believe that this is the only way that money can be
found to improve the physical protection of nuclear facilities, since not one AES [nuclear
electric power station] in Russia corresponds with the regulations.”71 Minatom chief , Alexander Rumyantsev was even considering a changing in the form of ownership of nuclear facilities to some form of mixed state and private ownership on the parts of the nuclear site that do not pose security threats. This is a remarkable development in the attitude of Rumyantsev team toward privatization. Rumyantsev seemed to favor an increase
in the control of the Ministry and state over the nuclear plants for economic and safety
reasons and was reluctant to consider privatization schemes with respect to power plants.
The new development suggests that if Minatom’s scramble for funds is not successful
and it will reach a point where it considers the lacks of maintenance and refurbishment
funds critical.

C. Nuclear Power Plant Construction¾International
¾
Regardless of the economic efficiency of nuclear power in Russia, Minatom is
actively promoting nuclear power plant construction internationally. Currently, there are
Russian nuclear power construction projects underway in Iran, China, India. Additional
projects are being considered in each of these countries. Also, Minatom is preparing to
bid on a nuclear construction project in Finland where it will be competing against Germany, France, Britain and Sweden. Construction projects in Kazakhstan and the Ukraine
are also slated.
Objectively, these projects must be viewed with a certain amount of skepticism.
We have done a rough comparison of the estimated cost of nuclear facilities to the
amounts that Minatom is reportedly receiving for these construction activities. By our
estimates, the base construction cost in Russia of a VVER-1000 plant is $1.4 billion not
counting the interest cost during construction. Adding in the interest cost and contingencies during construction runs the price up to $2.2 billion at a 10 percent interest rate.
Based on our calculations, in most cases it appears that the terms under which Russia has
agreed to participate in the international construction projects offer at best slender profits.
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Our estimate of the cost per reactor is derived in the following way. Based on the
OECD study, the Russian cost of a 604MW nuclear reactor is $1521/kW (shown in Table
3). Scaling this to a 1000MW plant gives $1375/kW or $1.375 billion for the plant. The
OECD estimate of interest during construction, decommissioning, and contingency costs
add 61 percent to the actual construction cost. Interest alone adds 37 percent. This gives
$2.2 billion for the total cost of a 1000MW plant at start up. The cost of two units constructed on the same site at the same time is estimated to reduce cost by 10 percent.
We interpret actual construction cost to be the cost of buildings and equipment.
We can roughly separate the cost of equipment and buildings based on data from the U.S.
experience. The average equipment cost for U.S. plants was 77 percent of the total cost
and buildings was 23 percent. Based on this, the equipment cost of a Russian 1000MW
VVER reactor is around $1.06 billion. Financing on the equipment share of cost during
construction would raise the total on the equipment to $1.44 billion.
1. India
In July 2000 Russia and India finally agreed on the terms for the construction of
two 1000MW VVER reactors at Kudankulam nuclear power plant. The construction was
estimated to cost India $3 billion. The initial agreement was signed in the 1980s. Construction of Kudankulam-1 was scheduled to start in October 2001, and the reactor is
scheduled to be commissioned in 2007. Kudankulam-2 is set to begin operating in 2008.72
Russia will design the plant and supply 90 percent of the equipment and materials. Russia
will build most of the reactors on credit, funds for construction being allocated to Minatom from Federal Budget. The terms of credit are very favorable to India which raised
numerous cries from critics of the project in Russia. The announced contract price is $2
billion.
It is very unlikely that the construction of the two reactors is a profitable venture
for Minatom. It is not clear exactly what Russia is supplying, but the implication is that it
is more than the nuclear reactor equipment. If Russia supplied only the equipment, our
estimate of the cost would be around $2 billion not counting financing during construction. On the other hand, if Russia is supplying 90 percent of the total costs, this amounts
to $2.23 billion not counting financing, which is above the contract price. Again, if the
Russian government is carrying the construction financing it will run this project significantly into the red from the Russian perspective.
Rather than a profitable venture in its own right, likely this is a long term move by
Russian Federation and Minatom to gain a foothold in the Indian nuclear market. India is
considered by Russia a very important potential market for export of nuclear technology.
India’s nuclear market has been forecasted at $30 billion in the long term. In 2000 president Putin signed an agreement with Indian prime minister Vajpayaee to cooperate in nuclear research. Putin assert that this is only the beginning of Russian Indian nuclear cooperation. Nonetheless, Russia will have to raise the price of further work if it is to enjoy
profits from its expedition into India.
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2. China
In 1999 Russia started the construction of the first two VVER-1000 reactors of
the Jiangsu Tianwan nuclear power plant at Lianyungang in northeast China. They are
schedule for commission in 2004 and 2005. Total cost of the reactors is expected to be
$3.2 billion, financed by $1.3 billion in loans from the Russian government, $1 billion
commercial loans, and $600 million loans from the China Development Bank.73 Russia
will receive $2.4 billion for the two units.74 Russia is supplying the technology and the
reactor itself. China is responsible for construction and installation. Russia is financing
the $1.3 billion loan at 4 percent.
In 2000 construction has begun at two other reactors on the site that are scheduled
to be commissioned in 2005. China currently has another 6 reactors under construction
totaling 4400 MW envisaged an ambitious nuclear development plan for 2001-2006 with
several new reactors to be build. However, in 2000 China considered imposing a moratorium on reactor orders in its five-year plan because of a slowing economy and a lower
than forecast increase in electricity demand.75
In 1999 Russia and China also agreed to build a gas centrifugal uranium enrichment plant in Shaanxi province in China and to cooperate in the development of new
generation gas centrifuges.76
Based on our estimates, Russia may be enjoying a modest profit on its construction activities in China. Assuming that it is only supplying equipment and that this costs
$2.12 billion for the two units, the contract price affords some surplus to Russia. On the
other hand, financing more than half of the contract price at 4 percent arguably erodes
most or all of the surplus. For instance, the cost of lending China $1.3 billion at 4 percent
for 10 years if the true cost of the money to Russia is 5 percent is the equivalent of giving
China $110 million today. If the true cost of the money is 10 percent, it is like a $350
million discount, which is more than the surplus on the contract price, and if the term of
the loan is 20 years, the discount at 10 percent would be $520 million. Hence, even
though the stated contract price seems attractive, the terms make it somewhat less so.
Furthermore, it is not clear how the construction financing is being handled. If the Russian government is financing the cost of construction up to start up, the project cannot be
profitable given the stated repayment terms.
Again, it is likely that Minatom is trying to build market-share in a market that
has a significant potential for development despite the recent slow down in China’s nuclear power program. Minatom has recently declared that it will bid on the construction
of two additional reactors in China.77 The question remains whether Minatom can make a
profit in this market in the long run.
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3. Iran
In 1995 Russia and Iran signed a $800 million contract for the completion of a
partially built Siemens 1000 MW nuclear reactor at Bushehr, Iran. In 2000 Russia began
the construction of the reactor that was scheduled to be commissioned in 2002.78 The possibility of three new reactors to be built on the site for $3.5 billion has been discussed.
Talks for at least another reactor are due to begin, according to a Minatom official, in December 2001. Russia is training Iranian specialist to operate the plant. Between Russia
and Iran there also have been talks about developing together a uranium mine and an enrichment facility.
The originally announced contract price of $800 million for the reactor is below
cost by our estimates. It is not clear if the fee escalated since it was originally announced
in 1995. The prospect of building three additional units at this site for an additional cost
of $3.5 billion is also below cost assuming that Russia is supplying all of the material and
equipment. If this represents the contract price for the equipment alone it is closer to the
cost recovery level, but only if Russia is paid up front rather than financing the project
during construction.
4. Other Potential Projects
Besides India, China and Iran, Minatom tries to continue or expand its nuclear
technology exports to the Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Peru, Indonesia, South Korea, Vietnam.
Russia and the Ukraine have agreed to cooperate on the completion of the
Khmelnitski-2 and Rovno-4 nuclear power plants. Russia will supply equipment, materials and a loan but the details of the contract are still being negotiated. The power plants
are to be completed in 2-3 years at a cost of $ 600 million. Ukraine has also continued the
talks with EBRD about a loan for the completion of the two units.79 Also, recently Minatom announced that they intend to participate in an international bidding in 2002 to build
a fifth nuclear power plant in Finland.80 "We stand a good chance to win," claims Viktor
Kozlov, general director of Atomstroyexport. "We will face a tough competition from the
world's leading atomic energy firms [but] [b]y the time of the bidding, the Chinese project will nearly be completed, and Russia will take this opportunity to prove its ability to
build highly technological nuclear power stations and supply competitive products to the
world atomic energy market."81
Minatom claims that “construction of nuclear power stations in Iran, China, India,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine will provide 42bn dollars in 2002-2005 and 24bn dollars in
2006-2010.”82 These numbers seem wildly exaggerated given that only $5.2 billion worth
of construction is currently under contract in Iran, China, and India.
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D. Nuclear Fuel
Minatom is engaged in a number of nuclear fuel projects. In addition it is exploring the possibility of becoming a spent fuel repository for the world. Russia is a major
world supplier of nuclear reactor fuel. Expansion of nuclear fuel projects is one of Minatom’s strategic goals.
Our estimates are that Russia currently sells over $1 billion worth of nuclear fuel
per year. Part of this comes from enrichment of natural uranium and re-processing of
spent fuel. Most of this material is sold in Europe. Another major part comes from a joint
project with the U.S. called the HEU deal.
The HEU deal is a project under which Russia down-blends highly enriched,
weapons-grade uranium into nuclear fuel and then sells this to the U.S. The original terms
of the deal called for payments of $12 billion over 20 years. Some $2 billion has been
paid to date. However, given the current world price of nuclear fuel and the incentive
structure of USEC, the U.S. agent in charge of the purchases, the terms of the payments
are likely to move against Minatom. Nonetheless, the HEU project will remain a major
source of hard currency.
Nuclear fuel enrichment services are an important cash generating activity for
Minatom. However, the expansion of fuel initiatives beyond the ones that are currently
profitable is problematic. These new projects include MOX fuel fabrication, refitting
VVER plants to burn MOX, and spent-fuel storage among others. Both the MOX fabrication and refitting projects must be considered speculative because they are based on
Russian technologies that are as yet unproven. This does not mean that the technologies
are unlikely to perform, but it does mean that extensive and costly research must still be
done before these projects can move to the implementation stage. Even then, several
studies indicate that MOX is not economically efficient compared to enrichment of natural uranium, even including the savings in storage of nuclear wastes. Funds for the projects are not obviously available in Minatom’s budget and promises of international
funding have not materialized.
The spent-fuel project is somewhat further along. Testing of elements of the process was completed at the Mayak facility in the summer of 2001. Even so, there are a
number of hurdles left, including political pressure from grass-roots organizations
throughout Russia that are opposed to turning Russia into a nuclear waste repository. It is
worth noting that these groups have some legal forces on their side because Russian law
prohibits the importation of nuclear waste for purposes of permanent storage. However,
the slit in the tent through which the camel’s nose has appeared is the claim that spent
fuel will be imported for re-processing purposes. Minatom claims that nuclear waste storage could become a lucrative business venture, which may be true if the nuclear nonproliferation issues are sufficiently discounted.
1. Closed Fuel Cycle
It has also been and continues to be committed to a so-called closed fuel cycle,
which substantially expands Russia’s supply of nuclear material.
The breeder reactor technology is an example of a closed fuel cycle. The breeder
reactor actually produces more fuel than it uses to generate electricity. Russia has one
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commercial breeder reactor in operation currently, a BN-600. Another way of closing the
fuel cycle is to reprocess the spent fuel taken from nuclear generators. Nuclear generators
running on conventional uranium fuel create spent fuel which contains both recoverable
uranium and plutonium.
In addition to augmenting the supply of nuclear fuel, breeder reactors can potentially contribute to nuclear nonproliferation. Breeder reactors use up more weapons-grade
plutonium than do conventional reactors using plutonium. Former Minister Adamov was
committed to building the BN-800 and BREST-1200 reactors both of which have a high
capacity to dispose of weapons-grade plutonium. The new BN-800 under construction at
Beloyarskaya is going to use MOX and there are plans to convert the BN-600 to MOX.
New Minister Rumyantsev still supports the development of fast breeders but has decided
to decrease the focus on this technology and to diversify the range of research activities
funded. The west is also reluctant to support Russia in development of fast breeder technology in spite of the fact that it uses up more weapons-grade plutonium because the reactors create material that is itself close to weapons-grade.
The alternative to breeders is converting weapons-grade plutonium into a MOX
fuel that can be burned in a conventional reactor. In this sense, burning weapons-grade
plutonium in Russian VVER-1000 reactors is seen as a more secure solution since those
reactors “spoil” the plutonium irrevocably. However, VVER reactors need to be upgraded before they can use plutonium fuel. There have been plans for undertaking such
upgrades, but so far the closest that Russia has come to MOX fuel production and its use
as fuel in a nuclear reactor was the conversion of 6kg of military-origin plutonium into
30kg of MOX fuel which was used in the BOR-60 fast breeder research reactor at the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors, Dimitrovgrad. The conversion of the VVERs to burn
MOX is still an unproven though not necessarily an unlikely technology.
Another reactor technology is also being studied but is still in the development
stage. An international consortium formed by Russia (Minatom), USA (General Atomics), France (Framatom) and Japan (Fuji Electric) is working on the plans of a modular
high temperature helium cooled reactor with a gas turbine cycle (GT-MHR). Such a reactor possesses superior safety characteristics and also a high degree of burn-up of the
initially loaded plutonium. Spent fuel will have a low concentration of Pu239 and can be
buried without processing.
Construction of a large MOX production facility is also in the preliminary stages,
though there have been several intergovernmental agreements. The first was signed in
June 1998 between the governments of Russia, Germany and France. Italy and Belgium
have also joined in. The plan (known as DEMOX) calls for construction of a MOX fabrication plant in Russia using some equipment from the Hanau plant in Germany but recently the government announced that the plant will be simply decommissioned and that
the export of the facility in Russia “is no longer feasible” in the “current political situation.”83
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There are two agreements in place between Russia and the U.S. involving plutonium. The first of them signed in July 1998 covers scientific and technical cooperation in
handling plutonium extracted from nuclear military programs. The second was signed in
September 2000 and concerns the utilization of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium as a
fuel for existing atomic reactors and reactors that may be built in the future. The agreement specifies that the 34 tons of Russian weapons-grade material will be irradiated as
MOX fuel in existing nuclear reactors in Russia or other reactors agreed upon by both
sides. However, the Bush administration seems to be about to abandon the plutonium
down-blending project because of its cost. The Russian part of the project was expected
to cost around $1.76 billion and was to be paid for by the U.S. and other developed
countries, but no firm commitments were ever made.
A significant portion of Russia’s nuclear development policy is aimed at developing a closed fuel cycle around plutonium and uranium recycling from spent fuel. The
benefits of this technology are an increase in the useable energy resources, a decreased
environmental impact, and a reduction in the accumulation of plutonium. However, most
of the nuclear countries have abandoned the concept of a closed fuel cycle due to the poor
economics of the project and the current oversupply of uranium. An OECD study in 1994
estimated that the reprocessing option is twice as expensive as the direct disposal option.84 Moreover, an increase in large scale isotope separation activities poses questions
regarding nuclear proliferation.
While reprocessing of spent fuel seems unlikely to float on its own bottom profitwise, there is another element of the reprocessing equation that involves plutonium and
may gain the economic support of the west including the U.S. One way of disposing of
weapons-grade plutonium is by reprocessing it into a plutonium-uranium fuel mixture
called MOX.
According to a strategy laid out in 1998 by Minatom, weapons-grade plutonium
no longer needed for defense purposes will be used exclusively in the form of fuel for
power reactors. Minatom sees weapons-grade plutonium as an “immensely valuable energy raw material that will still prove useful to Russia when reserves of natural fuel are
exhausted in the world.”85 Russia firmly refuses to consider the alternative of burying the
weapons-grade plutonium as a way of reducing its stocks of military plutonium.86
Russia claims to need $2 billion to convert the VVER-1000 reactors and build a
plant to fabricate MOX. The U.S. has announced its willingness to contribute $200 million. Also Britain, France, Italy and Germany have declared that they will financially
support the program in the amount of $400 million. Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland
have expressed willingness to contribute. As an alternative the west could provide $1 billion for the construction of the MOX fabrication facilities and Russia would raise the
second billion for the VVER conversion by selling plutonium fuel to foreign nuclear
plants.
With the help of the U.S. and other developed countries, Russia may be able to
acquire the industrial production of mix uranium plutonium fuel that it currently does not
possess on one hand and meet its non-proliferation obligations on the other. However,
none of the technologies are proven and all of the alternatives require a substantial com84
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mitment of outside investment. Proposals for financing the scheme were expected to be
presented at G-8 summit this summer, but there has been no report of Russian success on
this matter. Depending on the disposition and magnitude of the net cash flows derived
from nuclear generation, Russia will be more or less likely to come asking cap-in-hand
for foreign assistance on these projects.
The international context seems unfavorable nowadays to reprocessing. The forecasts of uranium shortage in the seventies have proved to be highly exaggerated. Price of
uranium has plummeted in the late 90’s to ¼ o f its value in the early 80’s. “In these conditions, the extra cost involved in reprocessing and manufacturing the MOX compared to
the direct manufacture of new UOX fuel through the enrichment of natural uranium is not
offset by the saving in natural uranium due to use of the uranium and by the saving resulting form the reduction in the direct disposal of the ultimate waste. In other terms, this
strategy represents for the electric utility an increase in the cost of producing the kilowatthour, thus acting like a brake on their competitiveness, an aspect that is increasingly unfavorable in a newly liberalized market.”87
2. The HEU Deal
HEU agreement, formally known as “The Agreement Between the Government of
United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons,” was signed
February 18, 1993.88 Russia agreed to sell 500 metric tons of HEU. The initial implementing contract was signed by USEC and Tenex, acting as agents for the U.S. and Russia, respectively.89 The agreement is implemented through a commercial contract that is
periodically renegotiated to determine the price that USEC will pay for the material. The
current pricing provision of the contract expires at the end of 2001. From 1995 through
October 2000, USEC received from Russia about 3,000 metric tons of LEU blendeddown from approximately 103 metric tons of HEU. USEC paid Tenex about $1.6 billion
and the DOE paid an additional $300 million.90
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Economic Forecast Study of the Nuclear Power Option, Jean Michel Charpin, Benjamin Dessus,
Rene Pellat, Report to the Prime Minister, Paris, 2000 Commissariat General du Plan, p. 99.
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Most of the information in this section comes from two sources: “Nuclear Nonproliferation, Implications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium,” Report to the Chairman, Committee
on Commerce, House of Representatives, December 2000, United States General Accounting Office [from
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Milken Institute Review, Fourth Quarter 2000.
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USEC stands for the United States Enrichment Corporation. Years ago, the United States built
three uranium enrichment plants to serve the military and later to produce uranium for the nuclear power
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the United States Enrichment Corporation. This corporation stated to operate the Energy Departments of
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The interagency Enrichment Oversight Committee (EOC) conducts federal oversight of the implementation of the agreement and consists of representatives from various
executive-branch departments, mainly DOE and the State Department.
According to the contract, Tenex blends down a specified amount of HEU into
LEU. The amounts of LEU delivered to USEC vary depending the concentration U-235
in LEU required by USEC in response to customers’ requirements. Higher the concentration of U-235, less LEU can be produced from a given amount of HEU.
The contract specified that Russia would be paid separately for the enrichment
services and for feed. “This arrangement reflected the way nuclear reactor fuel markets
worked in the past: nuclear power companies buy natural uranium feed from a mining
company and ship it to an enrichment company, like USEC which holds the feed in trust
and is paid only for enriching it.”91 The agreement said that U.S. would purchase at least
10 metric tons of HEU annually from 1995 to 1999, and then 30 metric tons annually for
the next 15 years of the deal. The commercial contract says USEC has the option to purchase quantities up to these levels and that the price paid by USEC would be renegotiated
every year.
The contract was amended in 1995 and 1996 to allow Tenex to blend down more
HEU annually (12 metric tons in 1996, 17 in 1997, 24 in 1998 and 30 in 1999, and 30
from 2000 on). In the government-to-government agreement, the U.S. pledged to pay approximately $82 per SWU. USEC marginal cost of production was estimated to be
around $60 per SWU. SWU stands for Separative Work Unit. Since the proportion of
LEU to HEU varies, the amount of processing is measured in SWUs based on the amount
of HEU handled.92
When agreement was signed Russia was expected to receive about $12 billion
form the HEU purchase, $8 billion for enrichment services and $4 billion for sale of natural uranium component. “The enrichment component typically represents about two
thirds of the value of nuclear reactor fuel. The other third is the natural uranium feed”
(i.e., uranium oxide).93 Those figures assumed a constant price over the life of the contract. In practice, the prices have been renegotiated. The government-to-government
agreement specified that the U.S. would pay $28.50 per kilogram of uranium feed
shipped to America. However, the commercial contract specified that Russia would be
paid for the feed when the material was “used or sold” by USEC and the price was to be
renegotiated every year. As a result of the USEC privatization act in 1996 the “contract
was amended so that USEC, upon receipt of the LEU would transfer the title of an
amount of natural uranium equivalent to the natural uranium content of the LEU back to
Tenex so that Russia could sell the material on the world uranium market.”94 Since March
1999 natural uranium is physically transferred to Russia, at its expense. However Russia
had difficulties in selling this material. “Under the USEC Privatization Act of 1996 a
quota applies to the sale of natural uranium for consumption in United States. In addition
material is subject to trade restrictions in the European Union.”9596
91

Falkenrath, page 42.
Falkenrath, page 42.
93
Falkenrath, page 42.
94
GAO, page 7.
95
GAO, p. 12.
96
The United States anti-dumping law has come into play in the HEU deal. In 1988 Soviet Union
began to export uranium to the United States. This was a new source of uranium on the international mar92

Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs

51

Maloney & Diaconu

In addition Russia was unwilling to sell much of this material because the market
price of uranium has been declining in recent years and “has fallen below a minimum
selling price established by Russia.”97 In March 1999, Tenex on one side and Cameco
(Canada), COGEMA (France) and NUKEM (Germany) on the other side agreed on a
contract that “gave the companies an exclusive option to purchase the natural uranium
component of the LEU deliveries provided that the market price for natural uranium
component of the LEU deliveries was above a minimum price determined by Tenex.”98
Allegedly, between 1995 and 1998 the USEC struggled over the contract trying to
protect its commercial interests but “not antagonizing the United States government sufficiently to jeopardize the last, most important step in privatization – the initial public offering of stock in the corporation.”99 In 1996 USEC declined Russia’s offer to increase
HEU sales in that year from 12 metric tons to 18. This caused strong public criticism and
the future of USEC privatization was threatened. Under these circumstances USEC
signed a five-year agreement with Russia in 1996 to pay the government-agreed price.
Currently, USEC and Tenex are negotiating to determine the price USEC will pay
for the enrichment component from 2002 to 2013.100 USEC has reached a tentative
agreement with Tenex such that LEU from 30 metric tones of HEU (5.5 million SWU
worth of enrichment services) will be delivered annually. USEC will pay Tenex for the
enrichment services at a price that would be based on an agreed discount below “published market prices”.101 This would mean substantial decline in the price that USEC is
paying Tenex for enrichment services because under the existing contract market prices
are 10 percent below what USEC pays. However, USEC resells the processed material to
electric utilities mainly based on long term contracts that are priced on average higher
than market price and the price paid to Tenex for enrichment services. According to the
GAO report, USEC has been able to more than recoup its payments to Tenex from
charges levied on domestic nuclear power generators.
The consequence of the agreement will be that Russia will receive less than 12
billions estimated initially. To partially compensate Russia for the loss in revenue USEC
has tentatively agreed to purchase additional enrichment services form Tenex for uranium
ket. Because of the increase in supply and some market manipulation, the price of natural uranium fell by
half in 1991 that triggered the action of a coalition of domestic uranium mining companies to petition
Commerce Department to investigate uranium imports from USSR. As a consequence Department of
Commerce determined that the “fair” market value of URSS uranium was four times the world market
prices. In 1992 Department of Commerce imposed an 115 percent import duty on uranium imports from the
former Soviet Union. This also applied to any enrichment content of uranium. However it did not at that
time apply to natural uranium component derived from weapons. In 1992 Department of Commerce, in
response to lobby from domestic uranium industry, initiated a suspension agreement with Russian government. U.S. anti-dumping laws allows Department of Commerce to suspend anti-dumping duties if the offending importer agrees to regulate its sales. At this time, the restrictions were extended to the uranium
from weapons material. This agreement is still in force although its provisions have been renegotiated several times. Falkenrath, page 44.
It is not clear how to interpret the assertion referring to European restrictions since there are no restrictions on sales of uranium in Europe.
97
GAO, page 12.
98
GAO, page 13.
99
Falkenrath, page 42.
100
The new pricing agreement is likely to be signed by the end of 2001, WNA News 30 OctoberNovember 6 from NucNet News, 335/01, 8 November.
101
GAO, p. 14.
Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs

52

Nuclear Nonproliferation & Russian Nuclear Privatization

of non-weapons source. The natural uranium component will be delivered back to Russia
as in the HEU agreement. It is estimated that “this arrangement is attractive to Russia because revenue resulting from sale of these additional enrichment services to USEC would
go directly to Tenex rather than to Russia’s federal budget.”102 This provision raises the
question of what will happen in the U.S. market for nuclear fuel and what will be the effect on the share price of USEC.
Deliveries from June 1995 through October 2000 of over 3000 metric tons of
LEU blended down from about 103 metric tons of HEU103 represented about one fifth of
the total amount established in the agreement. Euratom Supply Agency reports deliveries
through the end of 2000 were 111 metric tons of HEU. The GAO claims that the delays
in shipment of low enriched uranium were caused, among other reasons, by Russian dissatisfaction with the level of revenue received and technical problems.104 The GAO says
that “USEC has consistently paid Russia for deliveries of low enriched uranium and accepted shipments in a timely manner”105 estimating that USEC has “satisfactorily carried
out its responsibilities as executive agent for the United States” despite the difficulties
that occurred.
A critical situation developed in 1999 when USEC warned that it would quit the
contract unless United States paid the corporation $200 million claiming that the decline
in market prices for enriched uranium was reducing its profit below the amount expected
when it was privatized. DOE disputed the claim and USEC did not receive anything.
USEC was not losing money on the HEU deal but it was not making as much profit as
projected. More, some of its contracts were to be renegotiated in line with the new market
prices. In December 1999 USEC decided to remain the executive agent but “USEC continues to face challenges in balancing its commercial objectives with the national security
interests of United States.”106
DOE and State Department officials agree that maintaining this balance is going
to be a “challenge” given that USEC has stated that “its priority as a private company is
to remain a profitable commercial enterprise and maintain maximum value for its share-
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GAO, page 15.
According to Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report 2000, page 10, “858 t LEU derived from
30 t HEU were reported to be delivered in the USA in 2000, in line with the quantities foreseen under the
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holders.”107 However, USEC has ” agreed to provide DOE and the State Department with
an annual report on corporation activities as executive agent and to notify DOE and the
State Department of any activities or other information affecting USEC’s ability or
Tenex’s ability to fulfill the implementing contract”108
Half of USEC annual sales of low enriched uranium come from Russia and also
almost 40 percent of total U.S. sales of nuclear fuel have Russian provenience therefore
important issue raised by HEU deal is the impact of the agreement on the domestic nuclear fuel industry.
The GAO report concluded that:
“The HEU agreement’s implementation has had a beneficial impact on the national security of United States, namely the removal of over 100 metric tones of weapon grade material of over 100 metric tones weapon grade material from Russia. Achieving this benefit
however, was not without cost. Not only has the U.S government spent $325 million in
purchasing natural uranium from Russia, but the United States also faces a growing dependence on Russian origin material for nuclear fuel” 109

It suggested that EOC should examine the impact of the deal on U.S. industry and investigate the most effective way to maintain the U.S. mining, conversion and enrichment industry. Also the report recommended that, if the actions of USEC are contrary to US defense interests, then the “U.S. government should be prepared to either replace it or take
on the responsibilities itself” and that a “contingency plan” is needed that will “detail the
circumstances under which USEC will be replaced … along with clear criteria for
choosing the replacement”110
From Russia’s perspective the deal generated 1.6 billion dollars of which twothirds went to Minatom and one-third to the federal treasury. Thirty percent of Minatom
revenues from the deal (20 percent of the total) have been used to finance the conversion
programs of Minatom. Most of the conversion program funding comes from this
source.111 Some money is also provided by Russian government.
3. Spent Fuel Storage
Against a backdrop of public outcry not unlike reactions in the U.S., President
Vladimir Putin signed a law in July, 2001, allowing Russia to import spent nuclear fuel.
Critics claim that this will turn Russia into the world’s nuclear garbage dump, but Minatom sees it as a potential profit opportunity.
In August, the Mayak facility began carrying out the first test of a furnace for recycling the waste. Spent fuel will be sent by armored train to the Mayak facility near
Chelyabinsk in the Ural Mountains. The recycling process employed at the facility extracts useable nuclear material from spent nuclear fuel rods. The first tests were per107
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formed in August on a furnace used to turn the residual radioactive waste into glass and
commercial operation of the third furnace for radioactive waste vitrification at the Mayak
site was started in the fall 2001.112
Spent fuel storage has problematic aspects. Turning Russia into a nuclear waste
repository is not a politically popular. However, Minatom is trying to link the nuclear
storage to fuel recycling and thereby mollifying the political opposition to some extent.
Regardless of the popular displeasure with the idea, it does seem that this may be one of
the most profitable ventures that Minatom can undertake, assuming that it gains the support of the United States. The project depends on Russia signing a peaceful cooperation
nuclear agreement with U.S. The U.S. has consent rights over 90 percent of the fuel that
can be imported, so commercial success depends on approval and support of the project
by the U.S.
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VI. PRIVATIZATION
A. Attenuation of Property Rights in Russia
The Russian experience over the last decade is a text-book study in the absence of
property rights. Since the fall of communism the economy has been riddled with charges
of corruption. The nature of this corruption has characteristically taken the form of asset
shifting.
After the fall of communism, joint stock companies (JSCs) were formed from
formerly state-owned enterprises. The federal government retained shares in these JSCs,
but control was passed to private individuals, who usually held shares in the enterprise.
Some shares were sold to foreign entities.
Gazprom is prototypical. This company owns most of the natural gas reserves in
the country, and owns and controls the natural gas pipeline system. Gazprom is the largest company in Russia. The government has 38.37 percent. Officially, foreign ownership
is 11.5 percent, but the government says "gray schemes" have enabled foreign investors
to acquire more than that, possibly already up to 20 percent. Germany's largest gas company, Ruhrgas, owns 5 percent.
The following story recounts a case of asset shifting that is probably all too commonplace:
Russia's main market watchdog said Wednesday that Gazprom managers did not
violate the letter of the law when they sold shares in the gas giant on the cheap to companies run by their children and friends. The Federal Securities Commission said a 1994
sale of 5 percent of Gazprom to Stroitransgaz for $2.5 million was legal. The value of the
stake at the time has been estimated to be as much as $70 million, some 30 times more
than was paid by Stroitransgaz, a pipeline builder. The children of former Gazprom
chiefs Viktor Chernomyrdin and Rem Vyakhirev, as well as former board member Arngolt Bekker and his daughter, control Stroitransgaz.113

Asset-stripping creates an unattractive climate for foreign investors. Analysts attribute to Gazprom's artificially low stock price to these fears. Gazprom’s current market
capitalization is around $10 billion compared to an independent valuation of its hydrocarbon reserves of more than $40 billion.
This Gazprom story is not unique either for Gazprom or for the country.114 The
case of the small American firm, Sawyer Corporation, shows how deeply the problem
runs in the core of the society.115
Sawyer signed a 25-year lease with the bankrupt Gus-Khrustalny plant in 1997
under which it paid millions of dollars to cover the company's social debts and spent millions more putting its workshop No. 5 back into operation. Sawyer says it has sunk $7
million into the Vladimir Region plant. But in May 2001, a Vladimir court found that
113
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Sawyer's contract was void in a lawsuit initiated by creditor ROEL Consulting. The court
also ordered that Sawyer be reimbursed $1.5 million for lost investment[.] [The appeals
court ruled with the lower court in invalidating the contract. Furthermore, it canceled the
$1.5 million reimbursement for inventories.] In early June, Sawyer representatives were
barred from entering the plant's grounds. Sawyer accused Vladimir regional officials of
masterminding the takeover[.]

The 1992 law on bankruptcy is contradictory. As pointed out by a former head of
the Russian Federal Securities Commission, the statute admits to a separation between
the spirit and letter of the law. As a consequence, nearly anyone can gain legal standing
and attempt to change the distribution of ownership claims to their favor through the
courts.116
In a study by the Russian Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), researchers remarked that the problem of attracting private foreign investment is that the big companies
can negotiate the support of the government at the highest levels to protect their investment. This is not so for smaller companies. As the BEA study puts it:
The third approach has been applied by all post-reform Russian governments with astonishing consistence. They have declared support for foreign investors and the principle
of national treatment, which is extremely important for creating a good image of the
country as an investment host. In fact, however, paternalistic approach and benefits are
extended only to large and/or internationally known, major leagues companies, while
other investors are left out of the government supervision and have no appropriate legislative support and assistance. Thus one has missed an opportunity to attract, on a large
scale, medium-sized and small entrepreneurial capital, which is usually flexible and often
technologically advanced.117

Small and medium sized companies are the backbone of growth in a market economy. In Russia these are the companies most disenfranchised. The Russian experience
points out exactly the prediction that can be used to measure the value of property rights
institutions.
Economic activity in a market based country is organized around firms. These
business entities range from small sole proprietorships (mom & pop operations) to large
multi-national conglomerates. In every market economy, most of the economic activity is
concentrated in the large corporations even though most of the businesses are sole proprietorships. Most firms start out because an entrepreneur has an idea about a new product,
or a way to make things cheaper, or a better way of organization production. Some ventures
are successful, some not. The ones that are not do not continue. The ones that are success116

The law says that a bankruptcy manager should draw up a plan for the distribution of assets
which must then be approved by the creditors who may introduce changes in that plan. The law goes on to
say that the bankruptcy manager should manage the debtor’s property. Local courts can whimsically interpret anything that the manager does to potentially violate the right of creditors to approve the disposition of
the assets, and apparently based on the Sawyer case, this can occur well after the fact. In the Sawyer case,
ROEL was a creditor to the plant before its bankruptcy. The manager broke the plant into eight parts, but
was only able to lease one unit, that to Sawyer. The attorney for ROEL admitted that his client had brought
the lawsuit at the request of Vladimir officials. His opinion was that local officials were angered that they
had lost valuable property to foreigners. However, as one plant worker noted, if it had not been for Sawyer,
he would not have had a job.
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ful have the singular characteristic: The business expands. Most often, business expansion
requires that the entrepreneur accumulate additional resources. Sometimes the entrepreneur’s success allows the entrepreneur to expand using personal wealth. More often, however, the entrepreneur must raise financial capital from other investors.
Property rights create a conduit by which small entrepreneurial ventures are transformed into large, multinational corporations. Property rights are the institutional rubric
under which private investors are willing to provide support to successful entrepreneurs
in order to leverage this success. Where these property rights are absent, growth is
stunted.

B. Scandals Throughout the Energy Sector
The most recent scandal at Gazprom is a good example of the kind of asset shifting that has become the commonplace in the energy sector. The case involves the sale of
assets to Itera, a competitor that appears to be owned by a holding company with a U.S.
(Florida) corporate charter. In 1999, Gazprom sold a controlling stake in a natural gas
producing company, Purgas, to Itera for $1300. Purgas now appears to be worth several
hundred million dollars.118
Similar stories are common throughout Russia. According to estimates by the
Comptroller's Office the state lost 18.6 trillion rubles as the result of privatization of the
oil enterprise, Sibneft. And more recently, shares in Sibneft fell 20 percent in an hour on
news that the company had sold a 27 percent stake in the company back to Chukotka
Governor Roman Abramovich only months after it had bought the stake from him. It appears that he was allowed to repurchase the stake at a “modest profit” to Sibneft so that
he could participate, after the fact, in a substantial special dividend.119
Transparency is a key issue in every discussion of privatization in Russia. The
World Economic Forum ranked Russian companies on the basis of their “governance
risk.” The rankings are shown in Table 8 below. Most of the panelists at the Russian Corporate governance session at the 2001 meeting were investment bankers of Russian firms
or international firms doing business in Russia. Generally, the feeling was that improvements in corporate governance, which means more openness, would be forced on companies by the international investment community. The various panelist outlined their recommendations to Russian companies. The general theme is well summarized by the
comment of William F. Browder, Managing Director, Hermitage Capital: “There is a
need to stipulate an honesty policy for auditors and investment bankers that is fixed by
large liability provisions.” The comment suggests that a substantial portion of the auditing in Russian falls below the level of accuracy that we have come to expect in the U.S.
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Table 8: Selected Firms' Size and Corporate Governance Risk Ranking
Company
Aeroflot
AvtoVAZ
Gazprom
Golden Tel.
LUKoil
MGTS
Mosnenergo
Norislk Nickel
Rostelecom
Sberbank
Severstal
UES
UHM (OMZ)
Vimpelcom
Yukos

Sales
1521
3241
17980
135
15036
259
1424
4379
891
2838
1589
12481
364
389
6358

Net Profits
44
42
3059
-13
3049
11
65
1327
26
321
110
234
21
42
2186

Market Cap
320
200
13068
314
10995
601
1111
3390
728
723
907
4736
156
783
8642

Risk
Moderate
High
High
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Low
Low
Low
Moderate

*All numbers in millions of US dollars. Market Cap is the market price of common stock times
the number of shares outstanding. Source: World Economic Forum, 2001

One interesting thing about the rankings shown above is that the electric and telecommunications firms are ranked as low risks while the gas and oil companies are ranked
as high risks. No doubt this has something to do with what we call the malleability of assets. That is, the assets of gas and oil enterprises are more easily shifted than the assets of
electricity and telecommunications. However, the predictions embodied in Table 8 may be
misleading when applied to the nuclear sector.
The nuclear industry is fundamentally different from oil and gas. The oil and gas
industries are based largely on natural resource endowments that are valuable in the
ground. Economists call their value “rents” because the income flow that they generate is
not directly linked to production. No matter who gets this income, the value is still there,
production still occurs, and consumers can enjoy the output of the industry.
Nuclear production is not like this. The nuclear industry is a manufacturing industry. The natural resource value of nuclear products is small relative to the value added
by processing. To be useful, natural uranium has to be enriched. For enriched uranium to
be valuable in producing energy it has to be carefully handled and employed in a technologically sophisticated power plant. For the power plant to work efficiently, it must be
constructed with precision and properly maintained. In this setting, the income flows
from the output of the production activity must be plowed back into the production process. There are few rents. Most of the money generated by nuclear enterprises must be
spent on the real resource suppliers that join in the production process. Otherwise, production stops, or worse yet, catastrophically malfunctions. This threat of corruption in the
nuclear sector does not exist in natural resource industries.

C. Privatization at Minatom
One of the most disquieting issues that has come to light in the privatization area
is the change in ownership and control of the financial institutions that are closely aligned
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to Minatom. Until recently, the bank that handled Minatom’s financial activities was
Konversbank and it was owned by Minatom. That has changed. Konversbank has been
taken over by MDM-bank. Moreover, it is not completely clear who owns MDM. Some
reports claim that it is owned by foreign-chartered stock companies that are most likely
controlled by powerful Russian businessmen but that may also have substantial foreign
investment. Clearly, foreign involvement at any stage of decision-making and management control within Minatom or its financial agents raises questions of nuclear proliferation.
It is interesting that the name, Abramovich, which shows up in the Sibneft scandal
also shows up in the discussion of Minatom privatization. The claim is that the former
Minatom chief, Adamov, was part of the Yeltsin power structure which included businessmen A. Mamut, R. Abramovich, and O. Deripaska. The Adamov plan to reorganize
Minatom was seen as strategy to concentrate the most important and profitable subdivisions of the sector¾atomic power generation, the production of TVEL’s fuel elements,
and uranium processing¾under one single structure working in the interests of the Mamut-Abramovich-Deripaska group. Professionals who were hindering implementation of
the plan were said to be ruthlessly culled.120
While this plan seemingly was sidetracked by the sacking of Adamov and the
choice of his replacement from the top ranks of the professional nuclear scientists, it is
not clear that the worm has turned. The primary vehicle that the Mamut-AbramovichDeripaska group was preparing as the engine of privatization in the Adamov regime was
the MDM Bank and this bank has continued to gather control over Minatom business activities. Since 1999, MDM Bank has been positioning itself to take over Konversbank.
Konversbank is the financial institution that handles all of the international business
dealings of Minatom including the lucrative HEU deal with the U.S. under which around
$2 billion has been paid to Minatom for nuclear fuel processing. Until recently Konversbank was 90 percent owned by Minatom through its subsidiaries such as TVEL and
Tenex. However MDM attempted to take control through a complex and contentious new
share issue. While the Minatom enterprises were able to stop this transfer in July, they
seem to have lost control during an August 31st shareholder meeting, and it now appears
that MDM Bank has control of 60 percent of the voting stock. 121
Even though the financial restructuring of Konversbank and the corporate control
transfer to MDM Bank does not in and of itself imply corruption, it is somewhat sinister.
While corruption is not automatically implied by privatization, it is a troubling threat, and
much more so in the nuclear industry than in oil and gas.
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1. Relationship to Rosenergoatom
If Minatom is restructured in some way that makes it a publicly traded joint-stock
company, presumably Rosenergoatom will not be part of this unless the law is changed to
allow nuclear power plants to be privately held. Even so, a JSC Minatom could continue
to oversee nuclear power generation. However, this would likely mean that it had less
control over the cash flows and investment decisions. As a consequence, Minatom is less
likely to pursue privatization in the large if it means giving up control of the nuclear generation cash flows.
On the other hand, a case can be made that if the Russian federal government is
sincerely interested in developing a viable and vibrant, competitive wholesale electric
market, it would encourage the most active possible participation by the nuclear generation sector. Granting Minatom full control of Rosenergoatom and allowing for privatization of Minatom with favorable status for foreign investors would arguably be the best
way to further this cause.
2. Other Privatization Issues
Restructuring of the Minatom divisions is a point of continuing discussion. It appears that Tenex is currently structured as a JSC. It is a major player in the HEU deal.
Several questions are posed: How is this affecting the HEU deal? Which other departments, divisions, agencies, etc., are involved in the HEU deal and which of them are
JSCs? What are the other Minatom JSCs involved in? Can we observe a difference in the
project development in those initiatives with JSCs versus those without?
Minatom has announced plans to spin-off several properties and divisions over
the next year to private investors. The announced list seems to include mostly nonnuclear entities that have come under the control and ownership of Minatom for a variety
of issues peripheral to its principal activities.
On the other hand, the major move made by Putin this year is the announced plan
to reintegrate subsidiary enterprises such as TVEL and Tenex. Whether this plan will include restructuring the major commercial components of Minatom into a joint-stock enterprise with private ownership, possibly foreign ownership of common stock claims is
unclear.
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VII. ISSUES OF CONTINUING INTEREST
From the research and analysis presented above, we think that it is clear the Russia is in the midst of significant social and economic change. That such change will affect
the projects and initiatives of the U.S. in regard to nuclear nonproliferation is almost certain. We think that the most obvious and timely question involves the restructuring of the
electric industry and the control of the nuclear generating facilities. On this hinge swing
the fortunes of Minatom. There are a number of other research questions in addition to
this. Some specific ones are outlined below.
1) Refine the estimates of the fundamental economic viability of the proposed
nuclear power initiatives of Minatom as well as the other proposed commercial projects such as fuel reprocessing.
2) Monitoring the electricity industry restructuring initiative of the Russian federal government. There are three main issues:
a) Control of Minatom over Rosenergoatom.
b) Divestiture of UES.
c) Tariff reform and wholesale market competition.
3) Monitoring reform within Minatom as it involves privatization. There are a
number of specific points of interest:
a) Expansion or contraction of small joint-stock or semiprivatized ventures associated with the agency.
b) Investigation of the operation of small joint stock companies
within Minatom.
c) Monitoring of restructuring within Minatom as it will affect the
disposition of scientists and other workers.
d) Monitoring the financial affiliations between Minatom,
Koversbank, Alfa Bank, and MDM Bank.
4) Debt Restructuring. The nature of the restructured contracts and the legal environment and financial environment in which these transactions are undertaken is a continuing interest. This is also linked to the monetary policy of the
country. For instance, what is the frequency of debt contracting and recontracting that is done in domestic currency versus U.S. dollars? A similar finance issue is raised in regard to the nuclear power plant construction projects
between Russia and other countries.
5) Monitoring reform at Gazprom. This includes:
a) Development of the wholesale competitive gas market.
b) Monitoring of startup companies and new capital projects in
the gas and oil industry and the power industry that may well
become competitors to Minatom’s nuclear power initiatives.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Based on our analysis, Russia’s nuclear sector is steaming into an uncertain economic fog and very possibly toward the shoals of financial distress. We draw this conclusion from our review of the restructuring of the Russian energy sector, restructuring
within Minatom, and its own non-defense business enterprise initiatives: electricity generation, nuclear power plant construction, and nuclear fuel processing.
Reform of the energy sector may yield benefits for Minatom in the short run but
will expose the nuclear sector to the harsh realities of competition in the long run. Hopefully, reform of the wholesale electricity market will result in cash flows sufficient to
provide adequate maintenance so that the existing plants will continue to produce. However, it is possible that the cash flows will not be large enough to allow for major upgrades in equipment. Considering both capital and operating costs, nuclear power does
not look particularly attractive from an investment perspective compared to other energy
options even if wholesale rates increase to cost-recovery levels.
The fundamentals of nuclear power that confront Russia domestically are also at
play internationally. Although Russia is engaged in several power plant construction
projects, they are of dubious value. The terms under which these projects are engaged do
not appear to be cost effective. It appears that Russia has agreed to build these facilities at
a loss. Possibly this was done to pursue foreign policy objectives. Possibly, this was done
to gain a presence in the international nuclear construction market. At all events, Minatom will have to charge more in the future to make these ventures a commercial success.
Finally, the nuclear fuel processing business is unlikely to generate as much revenue in
the future as it has in the past.
For all of these reasons, it is likely that the U.S. initiatives that provide Minatom
with hard cash will have greater leverage over the next five to ten years. Because it is
very likely that Minatom will not be able to raise significant funds from private investors
and to the extent that privatization may have the all too common effect of diverting cash
into private pockets, the money from U.S. sources with its attendant oversight furthers
U.S. national security goals in two ways: It controls nuclear proliferation and it helps to
stabilize the Russian economy through the nuclear sector, which comprises a substantial
portion of the energy resources of the country.
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IX. APPENDIX ON IMPORTANT ENTITIES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
A. The Electric Industry
The electric industry is an important piece of the puzzle in understanding the Russian nuclear sector. As noted above, electricity revenues constitute a substantial portion
of Minatom’s budget and nuclear power plant construction and reconditioning within
Russia is a major focus of Minatom’s plans for the future. Hence, an understanding of the
electricity industry in Russia is warranted.
1. Unified Energy Systems
Until 1992 the electric power generation sector had been organized in vertically
integrated companies, called energos, in each of the seventy-two oblasts under the supervision of the Ministry of Electric Energy.
In 1992 the government started a mass privatization program restructured the energy sector. The government formed a new company, RAO EES Rossii (commonly referred to as Unified Energy Systems of Russia or UES) that replaced the former Ministry
of Electric Energy. The government gave UES the ownership of the country’s largest hydro and conventional thermal generating stations (but not the nuclear plants), the high
voltage transmission network and the dispatch systems. UES was assigned the direct responsibility for transmission lines of 330KV and higher, substations and dispatch centers,
fossil fired power stations over 1000MW of capacity and hydroelectric power plants with
capacities greater than 300MV. The remaining generating capacity and distribution lines
were assigned to regional energos, set up as separate joint stock companies. UES acted
initially as a holding company for the Russian state, owning at least 49 percent in each of
the 72 regional energos. Two energos have regained independence from UES and its
share in four others has fallen below 49 percent, but its share in the rest ranges from 49 to
100 percent. At the end of 1999 UES controlled 65 percent of Russia’s generating capacity, nearly all of the high voltage transmission grid, and 58 percent of the country’s electricity distribution.122 UES owns the Central Dispatching Unit for the power grid.
In 2000 the shareholder structure of UES was the following: Federal ownership
52.2 percent, foreign legal entities 34.3 percent, Russian legal entities 5 percent, individuals 8.2 percent. UES shares are traded on the Moscow Inter Bank Currency Exchange, Moscow Stock Exchange, other exchanges of Russian Federation as well as on
the over-the-counter market. Since 1998 UES has been participating in the Bank of New
York program of issuing first level depository receipts against common shares. In 2000
UES through Bank of New York started issuing first level depository receipts against preferred shares.
UES is not managed as an integrated company, and it cannot fully influence the
operations of regional energos. It receives little economic benefit from its stakes in the
regional energos or from several of the federal level power plants. Divesting its stakes in
122
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regional energos was one of the conditions attached to the World Bank third structural
adjustment loan to Russia (SAL-3).
2. Rates & Rate Regulation
A federal regulatory agency, the Federal Energy Commission (FEC), was established in 1995, with a mandate to organize the wholesale market for electricity, regulate
wholesale market tariffs for power and energy, and define procedures for tariff setting at
the end-user level. The Commission also regulates the natural gas transmission and oil
pipeline industry. The legislation also mandated the establishment of Regional Energy
Commissions (RECs) to regulate tariffs for the sale of heat and power to customers in the
energo service areas.
The electricity market is composed of a wholesale and retail market. The wholesale market is supplied by the large electric generating plants plus regional energos that
have surplus power. Buyers are energos whose load demand exceeds generation resources and large industrial customers. The wholesale market is controlled by UES
through its Central Dispatch Unit. UES receives subscription fees for grid usage paid by
regional energos according to their regional electricity sales and by the other consumers
with direct access to the wholesale market.
Wholesale rates are regulated by the FEC. It appears that rates are paid to individual generators based on a kind of cost-based, rate-of-return formula. The FEC has prescribed a kind of time-of-day pricing, but this does not seem to be fully implemented. It is
generally held that the wholesale market does not operate on market based prices and this
is one of the main points for reform.
Since 1997 large corporate consumers have been allowed to buy power on the
wholesale market through the Settlement Center of Central Dispatch Unit or through direct contracts with generators to UES Independent Financial Operator.123 However not
many companies have taken advantage of this opportunity because UES requires that at
least 50 percent of the payment due to be paid in cash. According to a 1999 study about
10 consumers bought electricity directly from the wholesale market attracted by the low
cost of electricity under such contracts, which is about half of the average retail industrial
tariffs. As the non-payment problem has been resolved, we expect that more large customers are buying in the wholesale market.
In practice, there is substantial flexibility at the regional level in determining the
average tariff and allocating them among different categories of consumers. This is
probably not substantially different from the practice of economic regulation in the U.S.
except that the resulting tariffs are “determined by political reasons or allocation of lobbying forces between industry and power utilities in the respective commission, rather
than by economic factors. Consequently, the ‘cost-plus’ mechanism does not secure
guaranteed profit margins or break-even levels of revenue for the energos.”124 As a consequence in 1998 FEC has set the upper and lower limits of retail tariffs for each region.
In September 2001 Vladimir Putin signed a decree that establishes a single
agency, Unified Tariff Agency (UTA), for regulating all natural monopoly tariffs. The
agency will be formed on the basis of Federal Energy Commission and will set tariffs for
123
124

Skate (2000) p. 6.
Skate (2000) p. 7.
Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs

66

Nuclear Nonproliferation & Russian Nuclear Privatization

gas, electricity, pipelines, rail and natural monopoly telecom tariffs. The reason for
bringing all state controlled tariffs under UTA umbrella is to assure a more coherent approach on tariff rebalancing given the interdependence between tariffs. According to the
head of UTA, Georgy Kutovoy, from now on the tariff increases will be implemented
only once a year.
However, the decree has not dealt with the most acute problem regarding tariffs,
which is the status of Regional Energy Commissions. These are still under the control of
the regional governors because changing the way REC members are appointed requires
changes in legislation. Ministry of trade and economic development is preparing a draft
on Law on Electrical Utilities, that may bring some changes in this direction.125
3. Challenges for Reform
According to government estimates, 58 percent of existing Russian thermal power
capacity, including both gas and coal fired units, was scheduled for retirement or rehabilitation by the year 2000.126 The power sector has been unable to finance the needed
massive upgrade program. A lack of investment in new generation and distribution capacity means that Russia could face a power shortage within 5 years.127 Russian officials
estimate that country will need $6 to $11 billion annually from 2000 to 2005 to carry
maintenance and expansion plans, but UES has resources to invest only $1 billion per
year.
To attract foreign investments in the sector, reform of the electrical power industry has become a priority. In 1999 the government assumed the obligation of reforming
the industry in exchange for World Bank credits for the sector.
The most acute problem was the establishment of principles and procedures for
pricing of the electricity. Cross-subsidies impose artificially high costs on industry while
subsidizing households. Reduction of non-payments and non-cash payments. In 1997 the
list of strategic customers (customers who cannot be disconnected in the case of nonpayment) was significantly reduced.
In 1999 cash collection rates stood at less than 20 percent.128 However, UES revealed recently that in 2000 “in cash” payments to UES companies for heat and electricity accounted for over 80 percent. This is an impressive improvement in collections.
Moreover, in 2000 some of the consumers managed to pay some the debts accumulated
over the preceding years.129 Payment collection in cash by UES has been improving from
19 percent in December 1998 to 74 percent in July 2000 with barter in significant decline.
Over the first four months of 2001, the cash payment percentage was 94 percent. Profits
in the first quarter of 2001 were triple what they were over the same period a year earlier.
UES chief Anatoly Chubais pointed out in the 2001 stockholder meeting that that
in 1998 UES paid 27 percent in cash to Gazprom. Last year it was 92 percent, and this
year it hit 100 percent. Coal companies, which formerly received 16 percent in cash, now
125
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receive 100 percent in cash payments. Oil companies used to get 13 percent in cash will
now not sign contracts without 100 percent cash prepayments. Even so, the payments
from UES to Minatom have not reached this level in spite of the protests of Minatom.
4. Proposed Reform
The planned reform set out in the recent government decree on electric industry
restructuring is broad and sweeping. Some of the principal features are: partitioning of
the electric sector into separate generation, transmission, and distribution companies;
competitive markets; open access; transparency of both public and private enterprises in
the industry; and protection of shareholder interests.
Mandatory separation of the functional elements of the industry will require that
UES divest its assets into two or more separate companies. In order to protect the current
UES shareholder interests, the plan calls for each UES share to be traded in for a share in
each of the spin-off companies. Indeed, if such a plan is carried out, the divestiture itself
will have no direct impact on existing UES shareholders. However, it remains to be seen
if disintegrated electricity industry can operate as profitably as can a vertically integrated
enterprise.
An intriguing feature of the plan is to create a fully federally owned grid company
and dispatching entity. In the beginning, these companies will be spin-offs of UES. However, as the system develops, the federal ownership in the other parts of the dissolved
UES will be divested and these shares will be traded for the privately held shares of the
grid and dispatching companies. It is anticipated that this will be accomplished by March
2004. In this process, the current non-government UES shareholders will essentially receive full ownership of the existing UES power generating establishments. Current UES
assets include these generation facilities, the grid, and the dispatch control unit, plus an
interest in most of the regional distribution companies. Private UES shareholders will
give up ownership of the grid and the dispatch unit in exchange for the full ownership of
the generating units. Both the implied and stated intent of this treatment of UES shareholders is to protect their property rights, and in so doing to attract more investment, especially foreign investment into the generation industry in Russia.
The decree says that the retail rates charged by local distribution companies will
be regulated and based on the market price of wholesale power.130 Furthermore, after
some point, these distribution companies will be opened to competition by allowing direct access to final customers by generation suppliers. The decree also says that the nuclear power plants will be consolidated into one company.

B. The Gas & Oil Industries
The petroleum industry, both oil and natural gas, is probably the most important
economic sector in Russia. Clearly, the firms in this sector are the largest on an international basis. Forbes ranked four companies from this sector in the 500 largest in the
world. The magazine ranked Gazprom 138th with revenues of $17.708 billion in the year
130
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200, LUKoil 180th with $14.431 billion revenues, Yukos 339th with $8.219 billion revenues, and Surgutneftegaz 468th with $5.570 billion revenues. These Russian firms ran up
in the Forbes ranking in 2000 because of higher oil prices, but still these are large firms.
All are diversified petroleum companies. Gazprom is principally natural gas while the
others have larger interests in oil.
The petroleum industry is a major focus of foreign investment in Russia. Recently, a consortium led by Royal Dutch Shell has signed a deal to build a $9 billion liquefied natural gas facility on Sakhalin Island off Russia’s Pacific coast.131 However, this
consortium has no Russia partners, possibly due to the fact that the security of foreign
investment in Russia has been lacking in the past. British Petroleum, Williams International, and Norex Petroleum, Ltd., a Canadian company have all recently been caught up
in legal disputes involving investments in association with Russian companies.
Nonetheless, the rich petroleum resources of this part of the world attract economic attention. The new $2.5 billion Kazakhstan-to-Russia 1,510 kilometer pipeline is
about to open. Chevron is a 15 percent shareholder, the Russian government a 24 percent
shareholder, and several Russian companies are partnered with other international oil
concerns. Russian and China are also investigating a joint $1.7 billion oil/gas pipeline
link.
1. Gazprom
Gazprom is the largest company in Russia. It accounts for 25 percent of world gas
production and is the largest gas company in the world. It has 23.5 percent of the world
proven reserves. It represented 8 percent of Russia gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999
and is the largest Russian tax paying entity. It is ranked in the top 100 companies in the
world by market capitalization according to the Financial Times.
Gazprom is a vertically integrated gas company controlling 65 percent of Russia’s
gas reserves and 93 percent of production. Gas production and transmission are the core
business representing 95 percent of revenues. The key assets are its reserves and its pipeline network
The business is separated in 3 geographical units: Europe, the CIS and Russia.
Gazprom is the largest supplier to the European market with a 31 percent market share.
The supply of gas to European market is concentrated with 4 players: Russia, The Netherlands, Norway and Algeria having a 60 percent market share. In the Czech Republic,
Poland, Hungary, and Romania, Gazprom is the only external supplier. Foreign sales accounted for 54 percent of it revenue.
2. Financial Structure & Corruption Scandals
Gazprom is a “quasi-private” company. That is, it is a joint stock company in
which the government owns about 38 percent of Gazprom, Russian shareholders about 50
percent and 12 percent is own by foreign share holders. Officially 3.42 percent of the
shares are traded on the market. Gazprom shares are traded in a two-tier structure and
foreigners are prohibited to buy directly from domestic market. They have to buy American Depositary Receipts equal to 10 ordinary Russian trade shares that trade at 65 percent
131
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premium to local shares.132 The share of foreign ownership in Gazprom may be allowed
to increase to 20 percent but not more by law. This is the so called “ring-fence” market
scheme. However, foreign shareholders used “gray schemes” to circumvent the two tier
structure that, according to government estimates, have allowed foreign entities to acquire more than 12 percent “possibly already up to 20 percent.”133
Gazprom has been operated in hidden fashion in spite of the fact that shares are
publicly traded. It has been the object of many allegations of scandal, corruption, and asset shifting.
This year, especially after the replacement of Rem Vyakhirev from the position of
company CEO with Alexei Miller, there were intense talks about removing the ring
fence, measure that would allow Gazprom easier access to capital market and raise the
market value of local shares, but that has been ruled out at least for the time being.
3. Reform and Regulatory Restructuring
The financial service Troika Dialog says: “In terms of hydrocarbon production,
Gazprom is currently the world’s largest company, with 9.6 mln boe a day. [...]However,
in terms of revenues which it receives for its output, the company is far down the table,
because it sells around 60 percent of its output in Russia at a meager $14 per kcm, some
12 percent of the current European natural gas price. More over, non payments in Russian
and CIS market further dilute the value of Gazprom revenues. Russian domestic natural
gas sales are price-regulated, capping the company revenues. The government forces
Gazprom to subsidize the rest of the Russian economy by keeping domestic prices at abnormally low levels.”134
Also the company quasi private status has had, according to Troika Dialog, a direct effect on Gazprom governance. “At least until very recently, the government ‘s interest in the company was primarily of tax collector and consumer, while its shareholder
function was entirely neglected. The government didn’t control the management and did
not strive to enhance the company’s profits.[…] As a result, Gazprom management was
left to its own device and disheartened, or may be contrary, emboldened, by the lack of
government emphasis, much to the frustration of private Russian and foreign shareholders who embarked on a shareholder rights crusade. The government interest in Gazprom
management affairs became more acute recently, after changes in the Russian government.”
Part of the government interest was due to the critical situation of the company.
Company had a poor cash collection in Russia and CIS countries, experienced severe
cash shortages, reduced the investments and accumulated a huge maturing debt as a result
of heavy borrowing in before 1998 crisis. As a consequence the company accumulated a
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$11 billion in debt,135 and now is facing a $2.5 billion in principal and investment each
year. (Company net profits in 2000 were $ 2,964.6 million.) The current increase of the
gas prices in Europe have alleviate somehow Gazprom problems in the short term. Also
government tried to help Gazprom by raising domestic tariffs.
One important step that government took was to shine light on the company
opaque ownership structure, to inquire into the allegations of substantial assets striping,
and to improve company corporate governance. In the same time, it started drawing plans
for restructuring Gazprom, and liberalizing gas market.
One the first front, Putin has install his own man as CEO, Alexei Miller, and has
mandated that Gazprom clean up its act. Open accounting of revenues and profits are be
the rule. Vyacheslav Sheremet, “a bastion of the old guard of former CEO Rem Vyakhirev”136 was released from its position as the head of Finance and Economics department. Also the new CEO has operated important changes in the leading echelons of Gazprombank, that controls a large part of Gazprom cash flows in an effort to reassert and
strengthen the state control over the key area of the company. (Gazprombank is a subsidiary in which Gazprom has 69.7 percent stake.)137
On the second front, as a prelude to the sector restructuring and also a response to
the strong lobby of oil companies Gazprom is being forced to give up control of its pipeline system. In the future, the pipeline system will become like a common carrier through
which any producer can ship its gas on a non-discriminatory basis. This will have the effect of encouraging natural gas exploration and production by companies other than Gazprom and will allow the wholesale natural gas market to become competitive, as it is in
the U.S.
Under current law, gas producers have the right to use the pipelines, but they
complain that Gazprom’s prices are too high. As a decade-long monopoly over the gas
pipeline network slowly slips from Gazprom's hands, oil companies are gleefully eyeing
the sector with a view to expanding gas production. Oil executives hailed Prime Minister
Mikhail Kasyanov's recent announcement that the government would separate Gazprom's
production and shipping wings and open access to the gas transportation system to all
natural gas producers. "We will start developing gas fields at an accelerated pace. Gas
production in Russia will increase, and gas costs will go down," Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
head of Russia's second-largest oil producer, Yukos, said in a recent interview. He said
Yukos would in five years produce 15 billion to 20 billion cubic meters of gas a year if
Gazprom pipes were opened. Russian firms produce 60 billion cubic meters a year —
more than Italy's annual consumption — but flare most of the output as they have no
outlets for it.138
However, one month later government back tracked and announced that Gazprom
will keep its monopoly over the country’s natural gas exports, even after restructuring
plan takes place. Some analyst argue that Russian government does not want Russian gas
competing with Russian gas on the European market and driving gas prices down. Also
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was argued that this “means that Gazprom will continue to monopolize Russia’s gas sales
on world markets, while Russian oil companies will be able to sell only at home, where
tariffs are controlled”139 Russian government is willing to allow domestic gas tariffs increase only gradually over the next five years. Government officials said that restructuring of Gazprom will take a “long time” and the details will not be available earlier than
the end of the year. The reasons for which Russian government reluctance to start gas
sector reform may be the one that it will force Gazprom to stop subsiding domestic consumers and this is a sensitive political issue, especially in a country where gas is a main
source of heat.
Gazprom exports revenues have been falling this year seemingly as a result of
European gas market liberalization. This has meant no more long-term contracts for Gazprom. The impact of this result on domestic restructuring is uncertain.
Some plans to restructuring were announced by Gazprom board of directors.
However, it was repeatedly stated by members of Gazprom management and of Russian
government that “if the company is to be divided into production and transportation units,
it will not occur until three to five years from now.”140 The Economic Development and
Trade Ministry confirmed that “it would consider the restructuring of Gazprom not earlier
than 2002.”141
The restructuring of Gazprom is going to be realized in three stages
Stage one would involve spinning-off Gazprom’s non-core assets.
Stage two would entail the creation of a competitive gas market.
-Stage three would see the establishment of independent production and transportation companies on the basis of Gazprom’s assets.
In October this year the board of the company approved the plans to sell company’s non core assets the value of which is estimated at $1.6 billion and instructed the
company executive committee to prepare by December 1 a list of assets to divest , list
that will be submitted for approval of the Federal Property Fund.142
Also the removal of the ring-fence restrictions was expected by investors by this
year, especially after Miller appointment. A committee has been appointed by government to analyze the merits of two tier structure. A new decree on liberalization of Gazprom equity market has been issued In September company announced that liberalization
of the equity market will proceed in 3 steps. ”First, Gazprom shares would be listed on
more domestic trading floors; second, foreigners will be allowed to buy domestic shares;
and third, the two-tier market would be fully consolidated.”143 However radical changes
are likely to be postponed. Lately analyst agree an eventual removal of the ring fence is
not going to happen earlier than next year. Also the 20 percent cap on foreign ownership
is unlikely to be removed.
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